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Chapter 1
Search Frictions, Job Flows
and Optimal Monetary
Policy
1.1 Introduction
Recently, many authors have studies the impacts of monetary policy inn
search frictional labour markets.1 Blanchard and Gali (2008) and Sveen
and Weinke (2008) illustrate the new Keynesian perspectives on labour mar-
ket dynamics and nd that adding new Keynesian elements (monetary fric-
tion) into search and matching labour market models does not change too
much and conrm that the optimal monetary policy should be set to re-
spond mainly to price changes instead of unemployment uctuations. Some
others examine the relationship between ination and unemployment in an
economy where exchanges in goods and labour markets both involve costly
search, based on modern monetary search models.2 Berentsen, Menzio and
Wright (2008) introduce a labour market with search frictions into Lagos and
1For paradigm search and marching labour market model and the survey of its devel-
opment, please refer to Pissarides (2000), Mortensen and Pissarides (1999) or Rogerson,
Shimer and Wright (2005).
2Search monetary models are pioneered by Kiyotaki and Wright (1991, 1993) for the
case of indivisible commodities and money. They impose the assumption of indivisible
commodities and money to guarantee the tractability of the model, because otherwise
the distribution of money holding becomes too complicated to get analytical results. The
search monetary frameworks which are suitable for economic and monetary policy analysis,
i.e., the models that allow divisible commodities and money but circumvent the aforemen-
tioned diculties concerning the distribution of money holdings, are developed along there
lines: i) to introduce the assumption of large families, like Shi (1997); ii) to introduce an
extra centralized good market and the assumption of linear negative utility of labour input
in this centralized good market, like Lagos and Wright (2005); iii) to introduce complete -
nancial markets among groups like Faig (2006). For further details about the development
of search monetary models, please refer to survey paper Shi (2006).
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Wright (2005). Their main ndings are that a rise of ination cause a higher
unemployment rate and that the long run Phillips curve slopes upwards. Shi
(1998) and Kumar (2008b) introduce a labour market with search friction
into another monetary search model, Shi (1997). Shi (1998) nds that an in-
crease in the money growth rate increases the steady state employment rate
and output when the money growth rate is relative low, but reduces steady
state employment rate and output when the money growth rate is already
high. Furthermore, Friedman rule is not optimal in general. However, Shi
(1998) gets a negative correlation of ination and the steady state employ-
ment rate when money growth rate is low (dierent from Berentsen, Menzio
and Wright (2008)), because the endogenous search intensity of households
in the goods market could be weakened by lower money growth rate. To
summarize, all above studies focus on optimal monetary policy and the re-
lationship between ination and the unemployment rate.
The present study pursues a more detailed question: What are the im-
pacts of monetary policy on job creations and job destructions? Further-
more, what is the implication on the optimal monetary policy in the long run
if we introduce endogenous job destruction? Berentsen, Menzio and Wright
(2008) (as well as Shi (1998)) assume the job destruction rate to be a con-
stant, as in the standard search and matching labour market model, say,
Pissarides (2000). Therefore, they cannot study the impacts of monetary
policy on the job destruction rate. However, one cares about this question
for at least two reasons. First, economists and the public not only care
about the unemployment rate in the economy, but also about how many
workers lost their jobs and the chance for unemployed workers to start a
new job. Second, as will be shown later in this study, job creations and job
destructions can have ambiguous eects on welfare and on the optimal long
run monetary policy. Because we model job creations and job destructions
in the sense that a rm chooses to enter into or quit the business, our model
also relates to the literature which investigates the monetary inuence on
the economic welfare through the channel of endogenous rm entry and/or
exit. Berentsen and Waller (2009) and Rocheteau and Wright (2005) study
optimal long-run monetary policy in the presence of endogenous rm entry
and monetary search frictions that make money essential in the economy:3
Berentsen and Waller (2009) claim that the optimal policy would deviate
from the Friedman rule if there is a congestion externality aecting rm
entry; Rocheteau and Wright (2005) claim that the Friedman rule must be
the optimal monetary policy in search equilibrium and competitive search
equilibrium, but not necessarily in competitive equilibrium.4
3Lewis (2009), Bergin and Corsetti (2008) and Bilbiie et al. (2007) also study optimal
monetary policy in the long run in the presence of endogenous rm entry, but they employ
ingredients other than micro-founded search models to make money essential, say cash-
in-advance constrains, money in utility function, wage rigidity, price rigidity and so on.
4Rocheteau and Wright (2005) dene these three equilibria by their market structures
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Endogenous job separation and rm heterogeneity along Mortensen and
Pissarides (1994) are introduced into Berentsen, Menzio and Wright (2008)
to study job market ows in a stationary equilibrium. We also follow
Mortensen and Pissarides (1994) by assuming that new jobs have the high-
est productivity in the economy and old jobs experience idiosyncratic shocks
which damage their productivity. We conrm the conclusion about the long
run Phillips curve in Berentsen, Menzio and Wright (2008): a rise of in-
ation increases the unemployment rate; the long run Phillips curve slopes
upwards; the economy reaches the lowest unemployment rate when the cen-
tral bank applies the Friedman rule. We also show that the endogenous
job destruction rate rises when the ination rate rises, because a higher
ination rate reduce the prots of all rms and make the less productive
rms more likely to quit the business. Therefore, high ination encourages
job destruction, which means that there are more jobs with highest pro-
ductivity replacing jobs with lower productivity every period, at the cost of
higher job losing rate and higher unemployment rate in the economy. Thus,
in the steady state of the economy, the average productivity level of the
economy is higher when ination is higher, although the total employment
becomes lower. This result shows that endogenous job separation and rm
heterogeneity have major impacts on optimal monetary policy because the
monetary authority can balance between average productivity level and un-
employment rate by setting interest rates. We claim that the destruction of
lower productivity jobs and the creation of higher productivity jobs might
be too low under the Friedman rule, which in turn implies that the optimal
long run monetary policy deviate from the Friedman rule.5 We use numerical
methods to verify this conjecture.
We then calibrate our theoretical model to the United States economy,
using parameter values commonly choosen in the relevent macro-labour and
monetary economics literature. Our numerical exercises show that the de-
struction of lower productivity jobs and the creation of higher productivity
jobs are indeed too low under the Friedman rule from the perspective of a
welfare maximizing monetary authority. The optimal interest rate implied
by our numerical exercise is around 0.02 at quarterly level, which roughly
equals the average quarterly interest rate of the US economy during 1955-
2005. Moreover, we also report that the maximal welfare gain of deviating
from the Friedman rule is worth less that 1 percent of consumption.
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows. The basic model is
of money-goods exchange: search equilibrium corresponds to bargaining; competitive equi-
librium corresponds to price taking; competitive search equilibrium corresponds to price
posting.
5This channel is absent in Berentsen, Menzio and Wright (2008), because of its exoge-
nous constant job separation rate and homogenous rms setting. A positive interest rate
would only lead to a higher unemployment rate but not to productivity improvement.
Therefore, the optimal monetary policy implied by their model is the Friedman rule.
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presented in section 1.2. The description of stationary equilibrium and its
properties are given in section 1.3. The numerical experiments of optimal
long run monetary policy are performed in section 1.4, and a nal section
concludes.
1.2 The Basic Model
The present model is mostly based on the "price taking" version of Berentsen,
Menzio and Wright (2008), except for the endogenous job separation and
rm heterogeneity along Mortensen and Pissarides (1994).
1.2.1 The Environment
There are two types of private agents: rms and households. There exists a
unit continuum of households; while the measure of rms are endogenously
determined. Households work, consume, and enjoy utility; rms create jobs,
maximize prots and pay out dividends to households.
Time is discrete and continues forever. In each period, there are three
markets that open sequentially. Market 1 is a labour market, markets 2 is
a decentralized goods market and market 3 is a centralized goods market.
These three markets are indexed by  = 1 2 3, respectively.
The labour market is modeled in the spirit of Mortensen and Pissarides
(1994), where rms create vacancies and households search for jobs. Firms
and households meet each other bilaterally according to a matching tech-
nology. A pair consisting of a household and a rm then combine to create
a job that produces a preliminary product, good , and bargain over wages,
. Wages are chosen so as to share the surplus from a job match in xed
proportions at all times. The worker’s share is   (0 1). Consequently,
more productive jobs oer higher wages. We assume that the wage is paid
in market 3, thus it does not matter whether wages are paid in cash or goods.
Each job is characterized by its productivity  and newly created jobs repre-
sent the highest productivity ¯, following Mortensen and Pissarides (1994).
Idiosyncratic shocks change the productivity of jobs according to Poisson
process with arrival rate . When a job is hit by such idiosyncratic shock,
a new value of  is drown from the xed distribution 	 ().  has nite
upper support ¯ and no mass points. Thus, the productivity of any given
job is a stochastic process with initial condition of the upper support of the
distribution and terminal state of the reservation productivity that leads
to job destruction. Filled jobs do not always exit when they are hit by
shocks, because there is a cost of maintaining a vacancy, 
. Existing lled
jobs are destroyed only if their productivity fall below some critical number
. Therefore, the endogenous rate at which existing jobs are destroyed is
	 ().
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Decentralized goods market is modeled in the spirit of the price-taking
version of the decentralized goods market in Berentsen, Menzio and Wright
(2008). Unlike the day time market in Lagos and Wright (2005), where
goods are traded bilaterally by bargaining between pairs due to anonymous
matching, there is a Walrasian auctioneer in the market so the participating
buyers and sellers take the market price as given. However, the present goods
market is not a centralized goods market because there are restrictions for
the buyers (households) and sellers (rms) to participate in the market. We
assume that the buyers and sellers must rst meet bilaterally6 according
to a matching technology as a pair to enter into the decentralized market
where goods  is traded. The decentralized market here is less decentralized
relative to that of Lagos and Wright (2005), but it does not make money
inessential as long as we maintain the anonymity.7 The good  is formed by
the preliminary product, good  without any labour input, according to a
transforming technology which is specied below.8 Unused good  is taken
by the rm from market 2 to market 3, without any depreciation or cost.
Centralized goods market is the same as centralized goods market of
Berentsen, Menzio and Wright (2008), which is in turn modeled in the spirit
of night time market in Lagos and Wright (2005), where good  is traded
multilaterally. All the private agents take the market price as given and
there is no restriction of entering into this market. Unsold good  would
vanish between two periods. Also, without loss of generality we assume that
agents discount at rate  between market 3 and the next market 1, but not
between the other markets.
We assume a central bank exists and controls the supply of at money.
We denote the growth rate of the money supply by , so that ˆ = (1+) ,
where  denotes the per capita money stock in market 3 and variables
with a “hat” above indicate the values of variables next period. Therefore,
in steady states,  is the ination rate. The central bank implements its
ination goal by providing deterministic lump-sum injections of money or
levying lump-sum taxes,  , to the households at the end of each period.
If   0, households receive lump-sum transfers of money; for   0, the
central bank must be able to extract money via lump-sum taxes from the
households.
6This assumption is made to make sure that the measure of sellers equals that of buyers,
so there is only one term of trade (selling equals buying) in the economy. This is a slightly
stronger restriction than other price-taking versions of the decentralized goods markets,
such as, Rocheteau and Wright (2005) or Berentsen, Camera and Waller (2007). However,
there is no loss of any generality and the analysis becomes easier.
7Rocheteau and Wright (2005), Berentsen, Camera and Waller (2007) and Berentsen,
Menzio and Wright (2008) make similar points.
8Berentsen, Menzio and Wright (2008) assume that rms rst produce the goods traded
in market 2 while the goods traded in market 3 are made from the goods traded in market
2. Here we assume the transformation techonolodgy to be of a dierent type. The reason
is explained in footnote 10.
6 CHAPTER 1. JOB FLOWS
We adopt Berentsen, Menzio and Wright (2008)’s convention for mea-
suring real balances , i.e. the nominal balances of households  in current
market 3, next market 1 and market 2 are deated by , the price level in
the current centralized goods market (market 3), which is the latest cen-
tralized goods market price known. For instance, when an agent brings ˆ
at money from market 3 to next market 1, we let ˆ = ˆ denote his real
balances. When he then takes this ˆ at money to next market 2, his real
balances is ˆ = ˆ, still deated by . If he were to bring ˆ through the
next market 2 and into the next market 3, his real balance is then given by
ˆˆ = ˆˆ, where ˆ = ˆ converts ˆ into the units of the numeraire in that
market. Notice ˆ = 1(1+), where  is the ination rate between this and
the next centralized goods market.
Throughout the discussion in the text, we assume policy and the pro-
ductivity distribution to be constant, and focus on steady states.
1.2.2 Households
Let  =   index employment status:  indicates that a household is em-
ployed;  indicates that a household is unemployed.
We now consider optimal decisions of the household, starting with mar-
ket 3. A household, who is employed in a rm of productivity  and with
real balances , solves
3( ) = max
ˆ
{+ 1(ˆ )} (1.1)
s.t. + ˆ = () + +


+ 
where  denotes the value function of an employed household,  is the
consumption in market 3, () is the wage paid by the rm of productivity
, and  is dividend income.9 We here assume that utility is linear in , as
in Lagos and Wright (2005) and Berentsen, Menzio and Wright (2008), to
ensure that all agents in the centralized market choose the same real balance
to enter into next period. Substituting  from the budget constraint into
(1.1) yields
3( ) = () + +


+  +max
ˆ
{ˆ + 1(ˆ )} (1.2)
Therefore, 3( ) is linear in .
9We assume the representative household holds the representative portfolio and there-
fore receives same amount of dividend. So the equilibrium dividend  equals the average
prot of all the rms.
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Similarly, the problem for an unemployed household with real balances
 reads
3() = max
ˆ
{+ 1(ˆ)} (1.3)
s.t. + ˆ = ++


+ 
where  is the home production of an unemployed household. We have
0    ¯, which means that home production is lower than the highest
productivity level. Substituting  from the budget constraint into (1.3)
yields
3() = ++


+  +max
ˆ
{ˆ + 1(ˆ)} (1.4)
3() is also linear in .
We now move to market 2. The value functions of an employed household
and an unemployed household, respectively, with real balance , read
2( ) = max
	
{() +3[(  ) ]}+ (1 )3( ) (1.5)
2() = max
	
{() + 3[(  )]}+ (1 )3() (1.6)
where  is the probability for a household to trade in the decentralized
goods market, and  is the real price of good  in second market and is
taken as given by both households and rms. The matching technology
in the goods market will be discussed later. (·) is the household’s utility
function of consuming goods. (·) is twice dierentiable with (0) = 0,
0  0, 00  0, lim
	0
0() = +, and lim
	+
0() = 0.
Using the linearity of 3, implied by (1.2) and (1.4)), equations (1.5)
and (1.6) become
2( ) = max
	
[() ] +3( ) (1.7)
2() = max
	
[() ] +3() (1.8)
The value function of an employed household with real balance  reads
1( ) = (1 )2( )+ 
Z 
¯

max{2( )2()}	 () (1.9)
8 CHAPTER 1. JOB FLOWS
The second term of the right hand side of (1.9) shows that household would
leave the rm (job separation) if the value of working in a rm with produc-
tivity  is smaller than the value of being unemployed.
The value function of an unemployed household with real balance  reads
1() = (1  )2() +  2( ¯) (1.10)
where   is the probability for an unemployed household to nd a vacancy.
The matching technology in the labour market will be discussed later. The
second term on the right hand side of (1.10) shows that the job which an
unemployed worker gets has the highest productivity. Substituting2 and
2 from (1.7) and (1.8) into (1.9) and using the linearity of 3 and3
yields
1( ) = max
	
[() ] +  + (1 )3(0 )
+
Z 
¯

max{3(0 )3(0)}	 () (1.11)
Substituting 2 and 2 from (1.7) and (1.8) into (1.10) and using the
linearity of 3 and 3, we get
1() = max
	
[() ] + +(1 )3(0)+ 3(0 ¯) (1.12)
Then, substituting 1 and 1 from (1.11) and (1.12) of next period into
(1.2) yields our equation for the value function of households in market 3
only, namely
3( ) = () + +


+  +max
ˆ
{ˆ + ˆmax
	ˆ
[(ˆ) ˆˆˆ] + ˆˆ}
+[
Z 
¯

max{3(0 )3(0)}	 () + (1 )3(0 )]
(1.13)
Similarly, substituting 1 and 1 from (1.11) and (1.12) of next
period into (1.4) yields
3() = ++


+  +max
ˆ
{ˆ + ˆmax
	ˆ
[(ˆ) ˆˆˆ] + ˆˆ}
+[(1  ˆ)3(0) +  ˆ3(0 ¯)] (1.14)
This completes the description of households’ problem.
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1.2.3 Firms
We assume that at the beginning of each period, rms can post a vacancy
at a xed cost 
. If the vacancy is matched with a household in the labour
market, the rm enter into the decentralized market in this period; other-
wise, the vacancy is destroyed. Let ! denote the value function of a lled
job and " the value function of a vacancy. We now consider optimal deci-
sions of the rm, again starting with market 1. The value function of a job
of productivity  reads,
!1() = (1 )!2() + 
Z 
¯

max{!2() 0}	 () (1.15)
The second term of the right hand side of (1.15) shows that rm terminate
the job if its value after the productivity shock is smaller than zero. The
value function for a vacancy reads
" = 
 +  !2(¯) (1.16)
where   is the probability for a vacancy to be lled by an unemployed
household.
The free entry condition reads
" = 0 (1.17)
(1.16) and (1.17) then imply

 =  !2(¯) (1.18)
We now consider market 2. We assume that the transforming technology
from goods  into goods  is characterized by #(), which is assumed to be
twice dierentiable and to satisfy #(0) = 0, #0  0, #00  0. We claim that
#(·) is the opportunity cost of trade in the decentralized goods market in
term of real balance in market 3.10
Then the value functions of a rm in market 2 reads,
!2() = max
	
!3[   #() ] + (1  )!3(  0) (1.19)
where  is the probability for a rm to trade in market 2. !3(· · ·) is the
value function of a rm in market 3, in which the rst argument is the
productivity of the rm, the second argument is good  that the rm takes
10We want the opportunity cost to be independant of the rm’s productivity and to
be identical across the economy to ensure tractability of the model. Therefore, unlike
Berentsen, Menzio and Wright (2008), I assume that the preliminary product of the rm
is traded in market 3 instead of market 2.
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to market 3 and the third argument is the real money balance that the rm
takes to market 3.
The value function of the rm in market 3 then reads,
!3(  ) = +   () + !1() (1.20)
Substituting !3 from (1.20) into (1.19) yields
!2() =  + max
	
[ #()]() + !1() (1.21)
Dene $  max
	
[  #()], which is a rm’s prot in market 2 if it gets
the chance to trade. Substituting !1 from (1.15) into (1.21) yields
!2() = +$()+(1)!2()+
Z 
¯

max{!2() 0}	 () (1.22)
This completes the description of the rms’ problem.
1.3 Equilibrium
1.3.1 Goods Market
We rst describe the matching technology in the decentralized goods market.
We assume that the probability for household to trade in the decentralized
goods market  is exogenous and constant.11 Then, the probability for a
rm to trade in market 2  is determined in equilibrium. The measure of
rms must equal to the measure of the employed households 1 , where 
is the measure of the unemployed households, i.e. the unemployment rate.
The measure of rms matched in decentralized goods market must equal the
measure of households matched in the decentralized goods market, which
yields 1 ·  =  (1 ). Therefore, we have
 =

1  (1.23)
(1.23) means that the more rms there are in the market, the harder it is
for a rm to be matched in the decentralized goods market and prot. This
is called a congestion externality in Berentsen and Waller (2009). We will
11 I make this assumption for simplicity. My assumption here results in a unique equilib-
rium. Berensten, Menzio and Wright (2008) assume  to be endogenous and to depend
on the unemployment rate, which brings much complexity into the analysis and results
in the possibility of multiple equilibria. However, Berensten, Menzio and Wright (2008)
only analyze the case of a unique equilibrium. Therefore, making  exogenous does not
change the analytical conclusion for the properties of the equilibrium unemployment rate
and the terms of trade.
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return to (1.23) in section 1.4.3 to explain why the present study is dierent
from Berentsen and Waller (2009).
We now establish the equilibrium conditions in market 2. The optimal
selling problems are identical for all the rms in the economy and read12
max
	
[ #()]
The FOC then reads
 = #0() (1.24)
The optimal buying problems are identical for all the households in the
economy and read
max
	
[() ]
s.t.   
The FOC then reads
0() =  if   
 =  if    (1.25)
where  is dened so as to satisfy
0(


) = 
Comparing (1.13) and (1.14) implies the problems of optimal real balance
taken into next period are identical for all household in the economy and
read:
max

{ + max
	
[() ] + } (RB)
Assumption 1 We have 1 +   , i.e.   1 .
Assumption 1 means that the money growth rate is higher than what
the Friedman rule would require. To see its application more clearly, we use
the Fisher equation, which links the nominal interest rate and ination in
the long run. The Fisher equation reads
1 +  =
1 + 

 (1.26)
where  is nominal interest rate. Therefore, Assumption 1 simply means that
  0, while the Friedman rule requires  = 0, i.e.  =   1. Assumption 1
makes sure that optimal problem (RB) has a meaningful solution, as Lagos
and Wright (2005) point out. Then we only consider the equilibrium of the
economy either in the case 1+  , or the case 1+ =  but equilibrium
is the limit as 1 +    from above.
12 In fact, there is a feasibility constraint   . We assume that this conditions is always
slack for simplicity, following Berensten, Menzio and Wright (2008).
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Proposition 1 Under Assumption 1, in equilibrium,  is the solution to
0()
#0()
=


+ 1 (1.27)
the households set their next period real balance at
 = #0() (1.28)
and the rm’s prot in market 2 (if they get the chance to trade) equals
$ = #0()  #() (1.29)
Proof: See appendix.13
(1.27) fully characterizes the equilibrium in the decentralized goods mar-
ket. We then have the following proposition for the goods market.
Proposition 2 (1.27) is the equilibrium condition for the goods market.
With Assumption 1, the solution exist and is unique. Furthermore,  is
decreasing in ; and the rms’ revenue in market 2, $, is increasing in 
and decreasing in .
Proof: See appendix.
Because $ = #0()#() is a function of , we will denote$ as$() later.
Note that, when  = 0,  and $() reach their maxima and 0() = #0()
holds.
1.3.2 Labour Market
We now describe the matching technology in the labour market. As in the
standard labour market literature, the total match is a constant return to
scale function of the measure of unemployed households,  and of vacancies,
%,
 = (% )
where (% ) is a CRS function and increasing in both % and .  is also
equal to the job destruction and job construction in equilibrium. Then, the
probability for an unemployed household to nd a job is
  =
(% )

= (& 1) (1.30)
where & = % is the labour market tightness. The probability for a vacancy
to be lled is
13Similar calculations can also be found in Rocheteau and Wright (2005).
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 =
(% )
%
= (1
1
&
) (1.31)
Furthermore, the functional form of (% ) is assumed to make sure that
 ,    (0 1).
We assume that wages are determined at the end of the labour market,
although they are not paid until market 3, as mentioned earlier. Therefore,
it does not matter whether wages are paid in money or goods. There is no
commitment to wages across period, so wages are newly bargained in every
period. We also use the generalized Nash solution, in which the household
has bargaining power  and threat points are given by continuation values.
The surplus for a household who meets a rm of productivity  is
'() =2(0 )2(0) =3(0 )3(0) (1.32)
by the virtue of (1.7) and (1.8) and the linearity of 2 in . The surplus for
a rm of productivity  is
' () = !2() (1.33)
The total surplus for such a job match '() is
'()  '() + ' () =3(0 )3(0) + !2() (1.34)
by denition. Wage bargaining divides the surplus from a job match in xed
proportions, i.e.,
'()

=
' ()
1  = '() (1.35)
Since '() is monotonically increasing in , job destruction satises the
reservation property. (1.35) implies that there is a unique reservation pro-
ductivity  that solves
'()

=
' ()
1  = '() = 0
such that jobs that get a shock    are destroyed. Therefore, jobs are de-
stroyed at rate 	 (). There are two group of jobs: the rst group includes
newly created jobs and old jobs which have not experienced idiosyncratic
shocks; the second group consists of old jobs which have experienced idio-
syncratic shocks. Jobs in the rst group have productivity ¯ and we denote
the measure of jobs in this group as (; while the productivity of sjob in the
second group follow a truncated distribution of 	 (), truncated at , and
we denote its distribution function as )(). In steady sate, we have that
the unemployment rate, new job matching, job destruction, job destruction
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rate and the measures of two groups of jobs are all constant. Therefore, it
required that, rstly, new job matching equals job destruction, i.e.
  = 	 ()(1 ) (1.36)
and secondly, job ows into the rst group equals job ows out of the rst
group, i.e.,
  = ( (1.37)
We then have the following proposition for labour market.
Proposition 3 The equilibrium condition in the labour market is charac-
terized by the following two equations for the labour market tightness & and
the reservation productivity :
[1 (1 )]

(1 )(1 1)
= ¯   (1.38)
+

1 +
	 ()
(& 1)
¸
$()+ 
1 (1 )
Z 
¯


[1	 ()] 

1  ·& = 0
(1.39)
The other labour market variables can be expressed by & and  as follows:
 =
	 ()
(& 1) + 	 ()
 (1.40)
( =
(& 1)	 ()
(& 1) + 	 ()
 (1.41)
 =
(& 1)	 ()
(& 1) + 	 ()
 (1.42)
Proof: See appendix.
1.3.3 Steady State Equilibrium
Proposition 1 and 2 show that, goods market equilibrium is solely dened
by  and equilibrium condition (1.27), independantly of the situation in the
labour market. Firm’s revenue in market 2, $() is the link between the
labour market and the goods market. This leads to the following denition.
Denition 1 A steady state equilibrium of the economy is a triple { & }
that satises equilibrium condition (1.27), (1.38) and (1.39).
Before moving on to the existence and uniqueness of the equilibrium, we
need to prove the following Lemma about the properties of the equilibrium
conditions in the labour market.
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Lemma 4 (1.38) slopes downward in ( &) space. Given $() constant,
(1.39) slopes upward in ( &) space and (1.39) shifts down if $() goes
down.
Proof: See appendix.
To establish the existence and uniqueness of the equilibrium, we only
need to consider the labour market with a given $(). By virtue of the
above Lemma, we know that  and & is also uniquely determined by (1.38)
and (1.39). Henceforth, we have established the existence and uniqueness
of the steady state equilibrium. Now we check the property of equilibrium
when the interest rate changes. The eect of interest rate changes on  is
clear as we proved in Proposition 2,  and $() become smaller when  goes
up. By virtue of Lemma 4, we can draw the curve of (1.38) and (1.39) in a
( &) space.
 yd
μ
equ. (1.39)
equ. (1.38)
Graph 1.1: The joint determination of  and &
It has been shown in Lemma 4 that, when $() becomes smaller because
of ’s increasing. Then curve (1.38) does not move and curve (1.39) goes
down. We then conclude that & becomes smaller, i.e.   0 and 
becomes larger i.e. 
  0. It is also useful to show that the unemployment
rate becomes larger. (1.40) implies that
*
*
=
*
*&
*&
*
+
*
*
*
*
=  	 ()
[(& 1) + 	 ()]2
(& 1)
&
*&
*
+
	 0()(& 1)
[(& 1) + 	 ()]2
*
*
 0
So we conrm the conclusion from Berentsen, Menzio and Wright (2008)
that a higher interest rate or a higher ination rate leads to a higher unem-
ployment rate in the long run; the Phillips Curve should slope upward.
Summarizing, we have established the following results:
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Proposition 5 With Assumption 1, the steady state equilibrium always ex-
ist and is unique. Furthermore, in this equilibrium the amount of goods
traded in the decentralized goods market, , and labour market tightness &
are decreasing in the interest rate , while the reservation productivity level
 and the unemployment rate  are increasing in .
The above proposition is the most important result of the present study.
We could also study the job losing rate and job nding rate in the labour
market. The job losing rate for the employed is 	 (), which is also the
job destruction rate and an increasing function of ; the job nding rate
for the unemployed is (& 1), which is an increasing function of &. We
then conclude from Proposition 5 that when the ination rate increases, it
is more likely for the employed to lose their job, because the job destruction
rate 	 () will rise. The reason is that the job is less protable for rms
($ goes down) and the rise of trading opportunities ( goes up because
there are less rms) can not compensate the prot loss. Furthermore, when
the ination rate increases, it is harder for the unemployed to nd a new
job, because the job nding rate (& 1) will rise.
1.4 Optimal Monetary Policy: Numerical Experi-
ments
We introduce endogenous job separation and rm heterogeneity into Berentsen,
Menzio and Wright (2008) and nd that a higher ination causes more job
separations and a higher unemployment rate. An important feature of the
present model is that higher ination cause also a higher job destruction
rate 	 (). Intuitively, higher ination make rms less protable in the
decentralized goods market and also less protable in general, so that rms
with lower productivity are more likely to quit the market, i.e. the rise of
. Because job destructions are modeled as a process of higher productivity
jobs replacing jobs with lower productivity every period, there is a role for
monetary policy to aect welfare by adjusting the job destruction rate.
We notice that Berentsen, Menzio and Wright (2008) assume all rms
to have the same productivity level and job destructions to take place at
an exogenous constant rate. Thus job destruction in Berentsen, Menzio and
Wright (2008) simply take the form of some rms replacing others with the
very same productivity, and higher unemployment must consquently gener-
ate a welfare loss. A positive interest rate would only a incur higher un-
employment rate but no productivity improvement. Therefore, the optimal
monetary policy implied by their model is the Friedman rule.
However, in our model, higher ination encourages job destruction, which
means that more jobs with highest (higher) productivity replace jobs with
lower productivity every period, at the cost of a higher job losing rate and
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higher unemployment rate. Thus, talking about the steady state of the
economy, the average productivity level of the economy is higher when in-
ation is higher, although the total employment becomes lower. This result
shows that endogenous job separation and rm heterogeneity may have a
major impact on optimal monetary policy because the monetary authority
can balance the average productivity level and the unemployment rate by
setting interest rates.
In this section, the optimal monetary policy of the central bank is rst
formally depicted. The possibility of a positive interest rate is also illus-
trated by taking the derivative of the central bank’s objective function with
respect to the interest rate. However, we cannot give proper conditions
with the exogenous parameters of the model to conform this possibility but
just conjecture that the destruction of lower productivity jobs and the cre-
ation of higher productivity jobs might be too low under the Friedman rule.
Therefore, we resort to numerical methods to justify our conjecture.
1.4.1 Optimal Monetary Policy
The total output of the economy + is the sum of rm production and home
production, i.e.
+ = (¯ + (1  ()
Z 
¯


)() +  (1.43)
We assume that the central bank treat all households equally when it
designs the optimal monetary policy. Then, by virtue of the linearity of the
households’ utility function in market 3, we can dene the periodic welfare
function , as,
, = () + +  #() 
% (1.44)
where the rst term is the total utility households get from market 2 every
period and the remaining terms are the total utility households get from
market 3. Because all the exogenous parameters are assumed to be constant,
the central bank’s optimal monetary policy design problem degenerates into
a static problem, in which the central bank chooses the optimal interest rate
 to maximize the periodic welfare function , subject to the equilibrium
conditions (1.27), (1.38) and (1.39). The central bank’s problem is,
max
	

[() #()] + (¯ + (1  ()
Z 
¯


)() +  
&
subject to (1.27), (1.38) and (1.39), where  and ( are dened by (1.40) and
(1.41).
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We know that for a given interest rate, terms of trade in the decentral-
ized good market,  is uniquely determined from Proposition 2; and the
endogenous labour market variables (&   % () are functions of  from
Proposition 3. So the central bank’s optimal monetary policy design prob-
lem can be treated as a choosing decentralized goods market allocation 
to maximize the periodic welfare function , subject to the labour market
equilibrium conditions (1.38) and (1.39). So the central bank’s problem is
equivalent to
max
	
,() = () + ()
where
()  [() #()]
()  (()¯ + [1 () (()]
Z 
¯

(	)
)() + () 
&()()
&() and () are solutions to (1.38) and (1.39); () and (() follow (1.40)
and (1.41).
It is optimal for the central bank to set the interest rate at  such that
the corresponding , which is the solution to (1.27) for given , satises
,0() = 0 (cbo)
We also denote  to be the trade term in market 2 when the central bank
applies the Friedman rule. Proposition 1 shows
0( ) = #0( ) if  = 0
0()  #0() if   0
which is equivalent to
0( ) = 0 if  = 0
0()  0 if   0
We claim that the Friedman rule is optimal in the long run only if
0( )  0. When 0( )  0, we immediately have ,0( )  0. Then
it is optimal to set the allocation smaller than  . The monotonicity of 
 mapping asks the central bank to raise the interest rate above zero and
deviate from the Friedman rule. Then,  = 0 is not an optimal monetary
policy.
Now suppose 0()  0 holds when   0. We know the facts that
00()  0; lim
		
0() = 0, becasue of the continuity of all functions and
lim
	0
0() = +. Therefore, there exist at lest one   (0  ) , such that
0() = 0(), i.e., ,0() = 0. Then it is optimal for central bank choose
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the allocation  = , if this the the unique solution for ,0() = 0. The
fact that    is a one-to-one monotonic mapping enable us to dene the
coresponding interest rate is . Therefore, the optimal interest rate is ,
which is the solution to (1.27) for given .  must be above the zero, the
interest rate required by the Friedman rule.
However, it is impossible to determine the signs of above terms ana-
lytically. Thus, we answer this question useing numerical methods in a
reasonably calibrated model.
1.4.2 Parameters and Calibration Targets
As the calibration in Berentsen, Menzio and Wright (2008), we choose a
quarter as one period and look at the United States economy during the
period 1955-2005.
Some specic functional forms are rstly set;
i) The matching function in the labour market is standard,
(& 1) = -&
where the labour market matching eciency is -  0 and the labour market
matching elasticity is   (0 1).
ii) The distribution from which the productivity level is drawn after idio-
syncratic shock is a uniform distribution14 within the support [0 ¯]. Then
the distribution function 	 () reads
	 () =


0 if   0



¯ if 0    ¯
1 if ¯  
Thereafter, )(), the distribution function of a truncated distribution of
	 () truncated at  becomes
)() =


0 if   
 (
) (
)
1 (
) =




¯
 if     ¯
1 if ¯  
iii) Household’s utility function in market 2 is
() =
.1
1 / 
14A uniform productivity distribution is also used by Mortensen and Pissarides (1994).
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where / the elasticity of utility function is a positive number belonging to
(0 1) and . the weight of market 2, is positive.
vi) Firm’s cost function is assumed to be
#() =
.1+
1 + 0

where 0, the elasticity of the cost function are positive. Therefore, the
functional forms #(·) and (·) satisfy the aforementioned properties. We set
the cost function to have the same scale parameter as market 2’s utility
function. This is because we measure the total utility in term of market 3’s
goods, we want the sacle of the cost of market 3’s goods to produce market
2’s and its utility level to be comparable.15
Thus, there are twelve parameters to be set:
• preferences as described by  and /;
• technology as described by , , ¯, -, , , 0 and 
;
• market structure as described by . 1 and .
We now calibrate this model such that the numerical prediction for the
steady state equilibrium ts the 1955-2005 United States economy on aver-
age.
We set  to match the average quarterly real interest rate, measured as
the dierence between the nominal interest rate and ination. We normalize
the home production  to be unit. We also set ¯ = 3.16 The job-specic
technology shock arrival rate, , is chosen to be 0.081, as in Mortensen and
Pissarides (1994). The parameters -,  and 
 are xed to be consistent
with the US labour market feature which is studied in Shimer (2005). Thus,
 is set to 0.028, the labour market matching elasticity with respect to
vacancy. - and 
 are chosen to match the average unemployment rate 0.06
and average UE (unemployment to employment) transition rate ( ), given
the average vacancies are normalized to be 1 as in Berentsen, Menzio and
Wright (2008). Notice that although Shimer (2005) claims that the monthly
average UE transition rate is 0.45, we need to compute the quarterly rate:
  = 1 (1 045)3 = 0834.
We then set ., 1, /,  and 0 as in the relevant monetary economics
literature. First, we set  = 09 without further explanation, because
 matters little for our quantitative conclusions. We also set 0 = 1 for
simplicity reasons. We still need two conditions to pin down . and /. The
15 In our comparable study, Berentsen, Menzio and Wright (2008) set the sclae of both
the cost function and market 2’s utility function to be 1.
16Berentsen, Menzio and Wright (2008) assume the average productivity to be twice as
high as home production. So it is fairly reasonable to set the maximal productivity to be
3 here.
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rst condition is that the equilibrium condition (27), which links the goods
and labour market, must hold numerically. Therefore, we have to use the
numerical value of the average interest rate when computing the equilibrium
condition (27). The average annal nominal interest rate is 0.074. Then we
claim that the average quarterly nominal interest rate is 00744 = 0019. The
second condition is that the money demand (real balance) predicted by our
model must be consistant with the average US money demand, 0.179. This
condition is commonly used in the monetary economics literature, say Lucas
(2000) and Lagos and Wright (2005) among others. In our model, the money
demand + equals

+
=

+
=
#0()
[() #()] + (¯ + (1  () 
¯+
2

The targets discussed above are summarized in Table 1. These targets
are sucient to pin down all but one parameter, , the wage bargaining
power of the households.  is assumed to equal , by the Hosios (1990) rule
from the labour-macro literature, although it is not a necessary condition
for reasonable calibrations.17 We rst set  to equal  and we will also check
the robustness of our quantitative conclusions when  varies later.
Table 1.1: Calibration Targets
Description Value
average unemployment  0.060
average vacancies  (normalization) 1
average UE rate   0.834
elasticity of   wrt & 0.280
job-specic technology shock rate  0.081
household’s trade probability in market 2  0.900
average money demand + 0.179
elasticity 0 of cost function 1
average nominal interest rate  0.019
average real interest rate 2 0.008
home production  (normalization) 1
ratio ¯ 3
Table 2 summarizes the calibrated parameter values. With , We rst
have to verify that check these values satisfy our assumption made in section
1.3.1. When determining the term of trade, we claim that the feasibility
constraint #()   is always slack. The maximal  and minimal  occur
when  = 0. With the functional form #() and () we have  = 1 and the
maximal #() is (	
)1+
1+ =
1826
2 = 0913, while the minimal  is  = 2032.
Therefore, we conrm our assumption that the feasibility constraint #()  
is always slack.
17See Shi (1998), among others.
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Figure 1.1: Interest rate and unemployment rate
Table 1.2: Parameter Values
Description Value
 discount factor 0.008
 home production 1
/ elasticity of utility function 0.799
 job-specic technology shock rate 0.081
¯ maximal productivity 3
- labour market matching eciency 0.390
 labour market matching elasticity 0.280
 household’s trade probability in market 2 0.900
0 elasticity of cost function 1

 vacancy posting cost 0.443
. market 2’s weight 1.826
 wage bargaining power of household 0.280
1.4.3 Results
Using the calibrated parameters from above, we can compute the steady
state equilibrium of the model for   [0 01] from our equilibrium conditions
(1.27), (1.38) and (1.39). Figure 1 plots the steady state unemployment
rate when the central bank sets dierent interest rate values. We conrm
the conclusion of Berentsen, Menzio and Wright (2008) that higher ination
leads to a higher unemployment rate in the long run.
Figure 2 plots the steady state welfare level when the central bank sets
dierent interest rate values. Normalizing the welfare at  = 0 to be 100,
we can directly read o the relative loss or gain of welfare when the central
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Figure 1.2: Interest rate and welfare ( = 028)
bank sets dierent interest rate levels. Figure 2 is the main quantitative
nding in our numerical experiments. Our calibrations show that the highest
welfare level is achieved when the central bank sets  = 0027 (quarterly
level), which is slightly above the long run interest rate level of the United
States ( = 0019 as mentioned before). The gain from deviating from the
Friedman rule can also be seen from the plot. Figure 2 shows that the
welfare improvement when the central bank sets  = 0027 relative to the
welfare level when central bank set  = 0 is less than one percent (0.5%, to
be more precise). Because our welfare measure is in terms of consumption
of good  and there is no disutility of work18, we claim that the welfare gain
of deviating from the Friedman Rule is worth 0.5 percent of consumption.
Furthermore, when central bank sets  higher than the best interest rate
level, there is much danger for the economy to experience signicant welfare
loss, given that the right side of the curve in Figure 2 becomes increasingly
steeper.
Figure 3 plots the steady state job destruction when the central bank
sets dierent interest rate values, because we are also interested in whether
higher ination can cause higher job destruction. Figure 3 conrms this
relationship.
Therefore, Figure 2 and 3 jointly suggest that it is very likely that job
destruction and the creation of higher productivity jobs are too low under
the Friedman rule, which in turn causes that a zero interest rate is too low
from a welfare maximizing point of view and drives the optimal long run
monetary policy away from the Friedman rule. Then it is optimal for the
central bank to set the interest rate strictly above zero.
18We assume that there is home production, which could be enjoyed as consuming goods
. That means we measure the utility of leisure in term of goods  in the model.
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Figure 1.3: Interest rate and job destruction
To summarize, our numerical exercises conrm that the Friedman rule is
not optimal in a calibrated model with endogenous job separation and rm
heterogeneity.
1.4.4 Robustness: 
Now we would like to check whether our quantitative conclusion that the
optimal interest rate is above zero is robust for dierent  values. As men-
tioned earlier, there is no justied reason for assuming that wage bargaining
power of households, , satises the Hosios (1990) rule. We try four dier-
ent values for  and the results are summarized in Figure 1.4 and Table 3,
namely, {015; 05; 072; 08}.
Figure 1.4(a) to 1.4(d) plots the steady state welfare level when central
the bank sets dierent interest rates   [0 04] in four cases with dierent
, the wage bargaining power of households in the labour market. Firstly,
it is clear that our conclusion that the optimal interest rate is above zero
is fairly robust for dierent  values; secondly, the lower the wage bargain-
ing power of the households, the more likely it is for the central bank to
gain from setting the interest rate above zero and the more welfare gain
from this derivation; thirdly, when  is suciently high, say   080, the
Friedman rule is approximately or indeed the optimal policy; last but not
least, the welfare improvements are all quite small, less than 1 percent. The
optimal interest rate for each cases and its welfare improvement relative to
the Friedman rule are shown in Table 1.3.
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Figure 1.4: Interest rate and welfare with dierent 
26 CHAPTER 1. JOB FLOWS
Table 1.3: Optimal interest rate for dierent 
 Optimal interest rate Welfare improvement
015 0.080 2.03%
028 0.023 0.85%
050 0.018 0.20%
072 0.007 0.08%
080 0.002 less than 0.01%
1.4.5 Further Comments
As mentioned before, (16) shows that there is a congestion externality in
the decentralized goods market, which means that the more rms there
are in the market, the harder it is for a rm to be matched. Berentsen
and Waller (2009) study optimal monetary policy in a modied version of
Lagos and Wright (2005) with endogenous rm entry.19 They claim that the
congestion externality is a reason for the Friedman rule to be suboptimal,
but their mechanism is dierent from mine. In their model, rms need to pay
certain costs before entering into the market every period. They then show
that there is too much rm entry in the market under the Friedman rule
and the congestion externality makes entry less ecient. They suggest that
the central bank should set the interest rate strictly above zero to reduce
rm entry in equilibrium. In the present study, we emphasize the role of a
positive interest rate in promoting less productive rms to quit by reducing
their prot in decentralized market. However, a higher interest rate reduces
rm’s prot no matter with or without congestion externality. Furthermore,
we claim that under the Friedman rule, the new job creations are too few
instead of too many in the presence of this congestion externality, which is
suggested by Berentsen and Waller (2009). Therefore, our explanations of
why the Friedman rule is not optimal go beyond the congestion externality
in decentralized goods market.
We also want to compare our results with Rocheteau and Wright (2005),
who also reach the conclusion that the Friedman rule may not be the optimal
long run monetary policy in a "competitive equilibrium"20 (price-taking) in
the presence of endogenous rm entry. The mechanism in Rocheteau and
Wright (2005) is essentially the same as that in Berentsen and Waller (2009):
due to the "congestion externality in decentralized goods market", rm entry
is too high under the Friedman rule. Furthermore, both Rocheteau and
Wright (2005) and Berentsen and Waller (2009) assume an exogenous rm
19The workhorse model that Berensten and Waller (2009) used is Berentsen, Camera
and Waller (2007), which is a version of Lagos and Wright (2005) with a banking sector.
20We borrow the terminalogy "competitive equilibrium" from Rocheteau and Wright
(2005) to show that the decentralized goods market pricing mechenism is price taking.
Also see footnote 4.
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exit rate equal to 1, while we study an endogenous rm exit rate.
1.5 Conclusion
We have presented a model with search frictional goods and labour markets
while the job separate rate is endogenously determined. We conrm the
conclusion from the related literature that the unemployment rate increases
with the ination rate and that the long run Phillips curve slopes upwards.
The economy reaches the lowest unemployment rate when the central bank
applies the Friedman rule. We also show that the endogenous job destruction
rate becomes higher when the ination rate rises, because higher ination
reduces the prots of all rms and makes the less productive rms more
likely to quit the business. This study also points out the possibility of the
optimal long run monetary policy to deviate from the Friedman rule if a
higher ination rate can promote enough high productivity job creation.
Our numerical exercises conrm the conjecture that the job destruction
is too low under Friedman rule for a set of parameters calibrated from the
United States economy. The optimal interest rate implied by our numeri-
cal exercise is around 0.023 at the quarterly level, which is slightly higher
than the average quarterly interest rate of US economy from 1955-2005.
Moreover, we also report that the maximal welfare gain of deviating from
Friedman rule is less that 1 percent of consumption, which is a relatively
small number.
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Chapter 2
Technology, Wage Dispersion
and Ination
2.1 Introduction
This chapter studies the eect of ination on the wage dispersions. The ex-
isting empirical literature that examines the relationship between the ina-
tion rate and the dispersion of wages reports a negative correlation1. Kumar
(2008a) develops a search-theoretic general equilibrium monetary model to
explain that a reduction of the ination rate would increases the pure wage
dispersion due to on-the-job search.
The present study focuses on the eect of ination on the wage disper-
sions due to rm heterogeneity as summarized by productivity dierences
in a search frictional labour market (on-the-job search is also allowed). We
introduce a search labour market á la Postel-Vinay and Robin (2002a) into a
micro-founded model of money, namely, Lagos-Wright (2005) search mone-
tary framework2. We choose Lagos-Wright (2005) as our framework, because
1For instance, Hammermesh (1986) analyses the relationship between the dispersion in
the relative wage changes and the ination rate using the wage data from the period 1955—
81 in the United States. He nds that higher ination, especially unexpected ination,
reduced the relative wage dispersion. Erikson and Ichino (1995) study the eects of
ination on the wage dierentials using the wage data from metal manufacture rms in
Italy of the period 1976—90. They nd that higher ination rate signicantly reduced the
wage dierentials.
2Search monetary models are pioneered by Kiyotaki and Wright (1991, 1993) for the
case of indivisible commodities and money. They impose the assumption of indivisible
commodities and money to guarantee the tractability of the model, because otherwise
the distribution of money holding becomes too complicated to get analytical results. The
search monetary frameworks which are suitable for economic and monetary policy analysis,
i.e., the models that allow divisible commodities and money but circumvent the aforemen-
tioned diculties concerning the distribution of money holdings, are developed along three
lines: i) to introduce the assumption of large families like Shi (1997); ii) to introduce an
extra centralized goods market and the assumption of linear disutility of labour input like
Lagos and Wright (2005); iii) to introduce complete nancial markets among groups like
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it is easy to introduce Postel-Vinay and Robin (2002a) labour market and
keep the tractability. The wage dispersions due to productivity dierences
in the context of a labour market with job posting rms and on-the-job
searching workers are well studied by Mortensen (2003) and Postel-Vinay
and Robin (2002a) among others. We choose to follow Postel-Vinay and
Robin (2002a) to build the labour market, instead of Mortensen (2003),
because, most of all, the productivity dierences are essential for a continu-
ous wage distribution in Postel-Vinay and Robin (2002a)3; while Mortensen
(2003) could generate a continuous wage distribution without productivity
dierences, i.e., the pure wage dispersion. In addition, Mortensen (2003)
models the endogenous productivity dierences as the by-product of rms’
optimal wage posting strategy, as the wage and productivity are decided
at the same time and one wage level corresponds only to one productivity
level. So the productivity dierences in Mortensen (2003) are more like con-
sequences rather than the reason of wage dispersion. On the contrary, in a
Postel-Vinay and Robin (2002a) labour market with endogenous productiv-
ity distributions, the productivity investment decisions are made before the
wage posting decision and independent of the wages paid by the rms.
One may ask why it is important to study the eect of ination on the
wage dispersions due to rm heterogeneity. There are a lot of theoreti-
cal explanations for why similar workers are paid dierently. Mortensen
(2003, Chapter 1.2) surveys these explanations within the search frame-
work of labour market. The rst kind of explanation is about on-the-job
search, which is pioneered by Burdett and Mortensen (1989, 1998) and fur-
ther exploited by many other wage posting models like Coles (2001) and
Postel-Vinay and Robin (2002a)4. The second kind of explanation concerns
the rm heterogeneity. Idson and Oi (1999) point out that labour produc-
tivity varies across industries and also across rms within industries and
this is indeed the potential reasons for wage dierentials. The third kind of
explanation claims that the dierent bilateral bargaining powers over wages
are a reason for wage dierentials, which is a natural implication from the
standard search and matching literature, say, Pissarides (2000). The last
kind of explanation ascribes the compensation dierentials as sources of
wage dispersion (Hwang, Mortensen, and Reed (1998) and Lang and Mu-
jumdar (2004)). As mentioned earlier, when Kumar (2008a) studies the
eect of ination on the wage dispersion, he only models one particular
kind of wage dispersion: the pure wage dispersion due to on-the-job search.
Faig (2006). For further details about the development of search monetary models, please
refer to the survey paper Shi (2006).
3 In a Postel-Vinay and Robin (2002a) labour market without productivity dierences,
there are only two kinds of wages paid in the economy, the reservation wage and the
highest wage that rms can aord, i.e., the zero prot wage.
4Postel-Vinay and Robin (2002a) study the wage dispersions when both on-the-job
search and rm heterogeneity are present.
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Then, some other important mechanisms listed above might be ignored in
Kumar (2008a). In fact, the wage dierentials caused by rm heterogeneity,
especially by productivity dierences of rms, is empirically very important.
Postel-Vinay and Robin (2002b) construct an equilibrium search model with
on-the-job search, worker and employer heterogeneity based on Postel-Vinay
and Robin (2002a), and calibrate it using matched employer and employee
French panel data of the 1990s (DADS, Déclarations Annuelles des Données
Sociales). They use this structural estimation to provide a decomposition of
cross-employee wage variance and nd that i) the share of the wage variance
that is explained by person eects is signicant only among high-skilled
white collars, and quickly decreases to 0% as the observed skill level de-
creases; ii) the contribution of market imperfections to wage dispersion is
typically around 50%; iii) the contribution of rm dierentials to wage dis-
persion is typically 30% to 40% except in the high-skilled white collars group.
Therefore, we believe that modelling rm heterogeneity in the context of a
labour market with on-the-job search5 is quite important in wage dispersion
studies.
We conrm that a rise of ination diminishes the wage dispersion due
to rm heterogeneity and on-the-job search. Furthermore, we nd an extra
channel (productivity distribution) through which the ination can aect
the wage dispersion and this channel is absent from the existing literature.
For tractability reasons, we only check the eects of ination on the bounds
of wages paid in the economy, as Kumar (2008a). We rst study the ef-
fect of ination on the wage dispersions due to rm heterogeneity in the
case of an exogenous productivity distribution. We nd that the rise of
ination diminishes the wage dispersion in the sense that the lower wage
bound increases while the upper wage bound decreases. The intuitions are
as follows. First, the upper wage bound decreases since higher ination
causes a prot loss of the rms. This is because the ination is modelled as
the cost of holding money in our micro-founded monetary exchange setting
and a rise of ination increases households’ cost of holding money. House-
holds then reduce their money holding in the decentralized market, which in
turn reduces rms’ selling and prots in this market. As being shown later,
the upper wage bound is zero-prot wage level (highest wage) paid by the
most productive rm. Therefore, higher ination decreases the upper wage
bound as the most productive rm pays less to keep its employees due to
prot drop. Second, the decrease of the highest wage that the rm could
5The conclusion about the eect of ination on the wage dispersion due to rms’
productivity dierences without on-the-job search are fairly easy to get in a version of
Berentsen, Menzio and Wright (2008) with heterogeneously productive rms, see Chapter
1. Chapter 1 clams that the wage paid by rms equals the home products plus a xed
portion of its prot of hiring a worker, which is a linear function of its productivity. The
prots become lower when ination rises, while the home product is unchanged. Then the
wage gap between any two workersis narrowed, i.e. the wages become less dispersed.
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pay reduces the prospects of wage rising for workers and then makes the
unemployed require a higher reservation wage (lowest wage) to compensate
their home product. The second mechanism is not included Kumar (2008a)
because of the dierent model chosen for the labour market. We then study
the eect of ination on the wage dispersion due to productivity dierences
in the case of an endogenous productivity distribution. We nd that a rise
of ination rst makes rms’ productivity less dispersed in the sense that
the lower bound of productivity rises while the upper bound of productivity
is unchanged. Intuitively, the rise of ination reduces rms’ prot, which
drives the less productive rms out of the economy. Therefore we observe
a rise of the lower bound of productivity. The highest productivity in the
economy is determined by the technology of productivity investment which
is assumed to be unchanged. So the rise of ination has no impact on the
upper bound of productivity. Furthermore, the rise of ination then dimin-
ishes the wage dispersion in the sense that the lower bound of wages rises
while the upper bound of wages drops. We then identify three channels
through which the ination changes the wage dispersion due to productivity
dierences. Two of the channels are the same as in the case of an exogenous
productivity distribution. The last one is the mechanism of how ination ef-
fects the wage dispersion through its eect on the productivity distribution.
This productivity distribution channel is our main contribution.
This study is also related to the literature incorporating goods and labour
market search frictions in a single model. Berentsen, Menzio and Wright
(2008) introduce search and matching into Lagos and Wright (2005).6 Their
main ndings are that the rise of ination causes higher unemployment and
the long run Phillips curve slopes upwards. Shi (1998) introduces standard
search friction of labour market into Shi (1997) and nds that an increase
in the money growth rate increases steady state employment and output
when the money growth rate is low; but reduces steady state employment
and output when the money growth rate is already high. Furthermore, the
Friedman rule is not optimal in general.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. we present the
basic model in section 2.2. The description of stationary equilibrium of the
economy with an exogenous productivity distribution and the eects of in-
ation on the wage dispersion in this case are studied in section 2.3. Section
2.4 introduces endogenous productivity investment decision and denes the
new stationary equilibrium in this case. Section 2.5 proves the main propo-
sitions about the eects of ination on wage dispersion in the endogenous
productivity distribution case. The nal section concludes.
6For search and matching in the labour market and a suvery of its development, see
Pissarides (2000) or Mortensen and Pissarides (1999).
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2.2 The Basic Model
The basic structure of the economy in the present model is the same as in
Berentsen, Menzio and Wright (2008), the goods market of which is based
on Lagos and Wright (2005), although our labour market setting is in the
spirit of Postel-Vinay and Robin (2002a).
2.2.1 The Environment
There are two types of private agents: rms and households. There is a
unit continuum of households; while the measure of rms is 3 .7 Households
work, consume, and enjoy utility and all households are equally skilled; while
rms enroll workers, maximize prots and pay out dividends to households.
Time is discrete and continues forever. In each period, there are three
markets that open sequentially. Market 1 is a labour market, markets 2 is
a decentralized goods market and market 3 is a centralized goods market.
These three markets are indexed by  = 1 2 3, respectively.
Market 1 (labour market) is modeled in the spirit of Postel-Vinay and
Robin (2002a), where households received job oers from the rms which
operate constant returns to labour technologies to produce good . The
marginal productivity of labour (hereafter denoted by ) dier across rms.
We rst assume that  is exogenously given as being distributed over [p
¯
p¯]
according to the continuous distribution  (cdf). However,  will be en-
dogenized in section 2.4. A rm is willing to employ any worker so long
as he/she could make positive prot for the rm.8 Firms send job oers
to the labour market each period to enroll works. Workers can either be
employed or unemployed, and the aggregate unemployment rate is denoted
by . The probability for an unemployed being contacted by rms is  ,
which depends on the measure of rms, 3 . We also allow workers to search
for a better job while employed, so rms make oers to employed workers
as well. We follow Mortensen (2003) to assume that the arrival rate of of-
fers to on-the-job searchers is also  .9 The matching process in the labour
market will be discussed latter. Furthermore, we assume that layos occur
7 In this section and section 2.3, the productivity distribution is exogenously given, so
we assume that  is also exogenous for simplicity reason. However, we will assume  to
be endogenous when we have an endogenous productivity distribution in sections 2.4 and
2.5.
8We also follow Postel-Vinay and Robin (2002a) to assume that there are no capacity
constraints for rms, i.e., a rm could employ as many employees as it is willing to. As
a result, no rm is ever induced to re a given worker to replace him/her by a less costly
unemployed in the context of this model.
9 In Burdett and Mortensen (1998), Postel-Vinay and Robin (2002a) and most of the
related literature, the oer arrive rate for the unemployed is usually allowed to dier from
the arrive rate of the employed for empirical reasons. We abstract from this case because
it is then simple to assume an endogenous 	 in latter sections, which is crucial for our
analysis.
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at a constant rate . The wage setting mechanism is completely adopted
from Postel-Vinay and Robin (2002a), that is, it is assumed that: a) rms
have perfect information about the characteristics (reservation wage) of the
workers applying for a job; b) instead of paying the same wage to all work-
ers, rms could change their wage oers according to the characteristics of
a particular worker; c) rms can counter the oers that their employees re-
ceive from another rms, instead of being utterly passive when facing from
an outside competition.
Under these three assumptions, we can immediately get the following
three basic rules about wage setting:
1. When a rm meets an unemployed worker, the rm would oer the
reservation wage for the unemployed and the unemployed worker would
take the job.
2. When two rms with same productivity level get into competition for
a single worker, the wage will increase until it reaches the highest wage
that rms can oer, i.e., the wage that yields zero marginal prot for
the rms.
3. When two rms with dierent productivity get into competition for
a single worker, then the more productive rm will keep/enroll the
worker, because more productive rm can oer a more attractive wage
than that which yields zero marginal prot for the less productive rm.
Also, as Postel-Vinay and Robin (2002a) do, we assume that there exist
legal restrictions on the wage contracts, which can be renegotiated only by
mutual agreement. Finally, to integrate Postel-Vinay and Robin (2002a)’s
setting into the present model, we dene that the working for a rm entails
both the producing activity and participating in the matching process in the
decentralized goods market.
Market 2 (decentralized goods market) is modeled in the spirit of day
time market in Lagos and Wright (2005), where good  is traded bilaterally
between pairs consisting of a household (buyer as well as consumer) and an
employee of a rm (seller as well as producer), due to anonymous matching.
All private agents are anonymous, which generates an essential role for a
medium of exchange. Household and rm then bargain over the terms of
trade, ( ), where  is the real balance paid by the household to the rm.
The terms of trade are chosen so as to share the surplus from a buyer-seller
match in xed proportions. The household’s share is 4  (0 1]. Unsold
good  is transformed into another kind of good  for market 3, according
to a linear transforming technology. Market 3 (centralized goods market)
is modeled in the spirit of night time market in Lagos and Wright (2005),
where good  is traded multilaterally. All the private agents take the market
prices as given. Unsold good  then vanishes between two periods. Also,
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without loss of generality we assume that agents discount at rate  between
market 3 and the next market 1, but not between the other markets.
We assume a central bank exists and controls the supply of at money.
We denote the growth rate of the money supply by5, so that ˆ = (1+5) ,
where  denotes the per capita money stock in market 3 and variable with
a “hat” indicates the value of variables next period. Therefore, in steady
states, 5 is the ination rate. The central bank implements its ination
goal by providing deterministic lump-sum injections of money, 5 , to the
household at the end of each period. If 5  0, households receive lump-sum
transfers of money; for 5  0, the central bank must be able to extract
money via lump-sum taxes from the households.
We adopt Berentsen, Menzio and Wright (2008)’s convention for mea-
suring real balances , i.e. the nominal balances of households in current
market 3, next market 1 and market 2, , are deated by 6 , the price level
in the current centralized goods market (market 3), which is the latest price
known for that market. For instance, when an agent brings ˆ at money
from market 3 to next market 1, we let ˆ = ˆ6 denote his real balances.
When he then takes this ˆ at money to next market 2, his real balances
is ˆ = ˆ6 , still deated by 6 . If he were to bring ˆ through market 2
into the next market 3, his real balances is then given by ˆ6ˆ = ˆˆ, where
ˆ = 66ˆ converts ˆ into the units of the numeraire in that market. Notice
ˆ = 1(1 + 5), where 5 is the ination rate between this and the next
centralized goods market.
Throughout the discussion in the text, we assume policy and the pro-
ductivity distribution to be constant, and focus only on steady states.
2.2.2 Households
Let  =   index employment status:  indicates that a household is em-
ployed;  indicates that a household is unemployed.
We now consider optimal decisions of the household, starting with mar-
ket 3. The household, who is employed in a rm of productivity  at wage
level  and holds real balances , solves
3(  ) = max
ˆ
{+ 1(ˆ  )} (2.1)
s.t. + ˆ =  ++


+ 
where  denotes the value function of an employed household,  is the
consumption in market 3,  is dividend income.10 Here we assume that
10We assume the representative household holds the representative portfolio to omit
the optimal investment decision of the households in nancial market. So the equilibrium
dividend  equals the average prot acroos all the rms. We denote by 
() to be a rm’s
periodic prot in steady state. Therefore,  = 
 p¯
p
¯

()()
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utility is linear in , as in Lagos and Wright (2005) and Berentsen, Menzio
and Wright (2008), to make all agents in the centralized markets choose the
same real balance to enter into next market. Substituting  from the budget
constrain into (2.1) gets
3(  ) =  ++


+  +max
ˆ
{ˆ + 1(ˆ  )} (2.2)
Therefore, 3(  ) is linear in .
Analogously, the problem for an unemployment household with real bal-
ances  reads
3() = max
ˆ
{+ 1(ˆ)} (2.3)
s.t. + ˆ = ++


+ 
where  is the home production of an unemployed household. Substituting
 from the budget constrain in the (2.3) gets
3() = ++


+  +max
ˆ
{ˆ + 1(ˆ)} (2.4)
3() is also linear in .
We now move to market 2. The value functions of an employed household
and an unemployed household, respectively, with real balance , read
2(  ) = ()+3[()  ]+(1)3(  ) (2.5)
2() = () + 3[(  )] + (1 )3() (2.6)
where  is the probability for household to trade in the decentralized goods
market. The matching process in the goods market will be discussed lat-
ter. (·) is household’s utility function of consuming good . (·) is twice
dierentiable with (0) = 0, 0  0, 00  0, lim
	0
0() = +, lim
	
0()  1.
Dene  as the solution to 0() = 1. Because ,  is unique and   0.
Because of the linearity of 3 ((2.2) and (2.4)), (2.5) and (2.6) become
2(  ) = [() ] +3(  ) (2.7)
2() = [() ] +3() (2.8)
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The value function of an employed household with real balance  in
market 1, reads
1(  ) = 2() +  
Z p¯


2[  %( )]()
+ 
Z 

(
)
2[  %( )]()
+{1     +  [7( )]}2(  ) (2.9)
where %( ) is the optimal wage oer of a rm with productivity  when
two rms with dierent productivities (,  and   ) get into competition
for a single worker. The threshold productivity level 7( ) is dened as
%[7( ) ] = . Therefore, the rm has to raise the household’s wage
to keep him if this household receives a oer from a rm with productivity
higher than 7( ). The rst term of the right hand side of (2.9) indicates
the case of layo; the second term indicates the case where the current
rm has to compete with a more productive rm; the third term indicates
the case where the current rm compete with a less productive rm and the
current rm has to a rise the current wage; the last term indicates otherwise.
The value functions of unemployed household with real balance  in
market 1, reads
1() = (1  )2() +  
Z p¯
p
¯
2[  %0()]() (2.10)
where %0() is optimal wage oer of a rm with productivity  willing to
hire an unemployed worker, i.e. the minimum wage that compensates this
worker for the opportunity cost of employment. The second term of the
right hand side of (2.10) indicates the case of receiving an job oer.
Substituting 2 and 2 from (2.7) and (2.8) into (2.9) and using the
linearity of 3 and 3 yields
1(  ) = [() ] +  + 3(0) +  
Z p¯


3[0  %( )]()
+ 
Z 

(
)
3[0  %( )]()
+{1     +  [7( )]}3(0  ) (2.11)
Substituting 2 and 2 from (2.7) and (2.8) into (2.10) and using the
linearity of 3 and 3 yields
1() = [()]++(1 )3(0)+ 
Z p¯
p
¯
3[0  %0()]()
(2.12)
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Then, substituting 1 and 1 from (2.11) and (2.12) of next period
into (2.2), one gets an equation for the value function of households in market
3 only,
3(  ) =  ++


+  +max
ˆ
{ˆ + ˆ[(ˆ) ˆˆ] + ˆˆ}
+3(0) +  ˆ
Z p¯


3[0  %( )]()
+ ˆ
Z 

(
)
3[0  %( )]()
+{1    ˆ +  ˆ[7( )]}3(0  ) (2.13)
Similarly, substituting 1 and 1 from (2.11) and (2.12) of next
period into (2.4) yields
3() = ++


+  +max
ˆ
{ˆ + ˆ[(ˆ) ˆˆ] + ˆˆ}
+(1  ˆ)3(0) +  ˆ
Z p¯
p
¯
3[0  %0()]()(2.14)
This completes the description of households’ problem.
2.2.3 Firms
We assume that the wage oer is xed at the end of the market 1, although
the wage is paid in market 3. Therefore, it does not matter whether wages
are paid in money or goods. Furthermore, We assume that the unsold goods
 in market 2 are transformed into   unit goods  when being taken into
market 3.
It is useful to start with computing '(), the average periodic prot
made by a rm with productivity  from employing a worker at wage , in
term of goods in market 3
'() =  (+     ) + (1  )( ) (2.15)
=  +  ( )  (2.16)
The rst term of the right hand side of (2.15) corresponds to the case of
being matched in market 2; whereas the second term corresponds to the
case of not being matched in market 2. Let %1() denote the highest wage
that a rm with productivity level  could oer, i.e., the wage level that
makes the rm obtain zero prot from hiring this employee. We have
'[ %1()] = 0
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Combining the above equation with (2.16) gives us,
%1() =  +  ( ) (2.17)
If the rm has to oer a wage level higher than %1() to win the competition
over an employee, the rm would simply give up hiring this employee.
For   %1(), let ,( | ) denote the number of employees who are paid
wages not higher than  in a type  rm . We also dene ,()  ,[%1() | ]
to be the total employment in a rm of type . We also express a rm’s
periodic prot, (), using the denitions we made above,
() =
Z 1(
)
0(
)
'(),( | ) (2.18)
Firms’ prots maximization decisions have been implicitly expressed as
rms’ wage setting rules (1 to 3) in the section 2.2.1. That is because,
there is no capacity constraints for rms, i.e., a rm could employ as many
employees as it is willing to.
We now implement those three wage setting rules in turn. Wage setting
rule 1 in section 2.2.1 implies that the wage paid by a rm of type  in order
to hire an unemployed worker is the minimum wage %0() that compensates
this worker for the opportunity cost of employment. %0() is then dened
by
2[  %0()] =2() (2.19)
Substituting 2 and 2 from (2.7) and (2.8) into (2.19) gives us
3[  %0()] =3() (2.20)
Then substituting 3[  %0()] from the above equation into (2.14) and
using the linearity of 3 yields an expression for 3(0),
3(0) =
+
1   (2.21)
where
 = +


+  +max
ˆ
{ˆ + ˆ[(ˆ) ˆˆ] + ˆˆ}
Wage setting rule 2 in the section 2.2.1 implies that
%( ) = %1() (2.22)
which could also be rewritten as, by denition,
7[%1() ] =  (2.23)
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Wage setting rule 3 in the section 2.2.1 implies that when two rms with
dierent productivity (,  and   ) get into competition for a single
worker, the worker would feel indierent between working in the rm with
higher productivity at the optimal wage oer for this competition, %( ),
and working in the rm with lower productivity at the highest wage oer
%1(), i.e.,
2[  %( )] =2[  %1()] (2.24)
Substituting 2 from (2.7) into (2.24) gives us
3[  %( )] =3[  %1()] (2.25)
Now we could derive 3 functions which explicitly depict rms wage oer
posting behavior, namely, 7( ), %( ) and %0().
Evaluating (2.13) at  = %1() and using the result of (2.23) yields
3[  %1()] = %1() +  ++ 3(0)
+ ˆ
Z p¯


3[0  %( )]()
+[1    ˆ +  ˆ()]3[  %1()] (2.26)
Then substituting 3[  %( )] for  = 0 from (2.25) into (2.26) and
using the linearity of 3 yields the expression of 3[0  %1()],
3[0  %1()] =
%1() +  + 3(0)
1 (1 )  (2.27)
Plugging (2.27) back into (2.13) yields the general expression of3(0  )
3(0  ) =  ++ 3(0)
+ ˆ
Z p¯


3[0  %1()]()
+ ˆ
Z 

(
)
3[0  %1()]()
+{1    ˆ +  ˆ[7( )]}3(0  )
=  ++ 3(0)
+ ˆ¯()
%1() +  + 3(0)
1 (1 )
+ ˆ
Z 

(
)
%1() +  + 3(0)
1 (1 ) ()
+{1    ˆ +  ˆ[7( )]}3(0  ) (2.28)
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where ¯() is dened as ¯()  1 (). Furthermore, by the denition of
7( ),
2( ) =2{7( ) %1[7( )]} (2.29)
Substituting2 and2 of (2.7) and (2.8) into (2.29) and using the (2.27)
gives us
3(0  ) = 3{0 7( ) %1[7( )]}
=
%1[7( )] +  + 3(0)
1 (1 )  (2.30)
Combining (2.30) and (2.28) yields
%1[7( )]
1 (1 ) =  +  ˆ¯()
%1()
1 (1 ) +  ˆ
Z 

(
)
%1()
1 (1 )()
+{1    ˆ +  ˆ[7( )]} %1[7( )]
1 (1 )  (2.31)
Note that
R 

(
)
1()
1(1)() could be integrated by part, using the de-
nition of %1(·) in (2.17). (2.31) is then rearranged to become
7( ) =    ( ) +  ˆ
1 (1 )
Z 

(
)
¯() (2.32)
Using the fact that
7[%( ) ] =  (2.33)
and (2.32), we have the expression of %( ), when   ,
%( ) =  +  ( )  ˆ
1 (1 )
Z 


¯() (2.34)
We now turn to the unemployed workers’ reservation wages %0(). Note
that, evaluating (2.30) at  = %0() gives us
3[0  %0()] =
%1{7[%0() ]}++ 3(0)
1 (1 )  (2.35)
Then, plugging 3[0  %0()] and 3(0) from (2.35) and (2.21) into
(2.20) gives us,
+
1  =
%1{7[%0() ]}++  +1
1 (1 )
i.e.,
 = %1{7[%0() ]} (2.36)
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By the denition of %1 in (2.17), (2.36) also reads as
 = 7[%0() ] +  ( ) (2.37)
Also, by denition %[7( ) ] = ,
%{7[%0() ] } = %0() (2.38)
Evaluating (2.32) at  = %0(), gives us
7[%0() ] = %0()  ( ) +
 ˆ
1 (1 )
Z 

[0(
)
]
¯() (2.39)
Plugging (2.37) and (2.38) into (2.39), we obtain the expression of %0(),
%0() = 
 ˆ
1 (1 )
Z 

 (	)
¯() (2.40)
To summarize, (2.32), (2.34) and (2.40) explicitly give us rms’ wage
posting behavior. This completes the description of the rms’ problem.
2.3 Equilibriumwith Exogenous Productivity Dis-
tribution
2.3.1 Goods Market
We rst describe the matching process in the decentralized goods market.
We assume that the probability for a buyer (a household) to trade in the
decentralized goods market  is exogenous and constant11. Then, the prob-
ability for a seller (an employee of a rm) to trade in market 2,  , is de-
termined in equilibrium. The measure of all employees of rms must equal
the measure of the employed households, 1  , where  is the measure of
the unemployed households, i.e. the unemployment rate. The measure of
employees of rms matched in the decentralized goods market must equal
the measure of households matched in decentralized goods market, which is
1 ·  =  (1 ). Therefore, we have
 =

1  (2.41)
11 I make this assumption for simplicity, because it results in a unique equilibrium.
Berensten, Menzio and Wright (2008) assume that  depends endogenously on the un-
employment rate, which opens the possibility of multiple equilibria. However, Berensten,
Menzio and Wright (2008) analyse only the case of a unique equilibrium. Therefore,
making  exogenous does not change the analytical conclusions for properties of the
equilibrium unemployment rate and the terms of trade.
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(2.41) means that the more employees of rms are in the market, the harder
it is for a rm to be matched in decentralized goods market and to make
prot.
We now use the generalized Nash solution12 to determine the terms of
trade ( ) in market 2. The buyer has bargaining power 4 and the threat
points are given by continuation values. The surplus for an employed house-
hold is
() +3[(  )  ]3(  ) = () 
which is independent of  and  and equals to the surplus for an unemployed
household
() +3[(  )]3() = () 
The surplus for rm in each matching is
 
which is also independent of .13 Hence, ( ) solves,
max
	
[() ][ ]1 (TT)
s.t.    0  
It is obvious that Problem (TT) is independent of the rm’s productivity
level and household’s employment status. Therefore, the problems of the
households’ optimal choice for ˆ, the real balance taken to next period, in
(2.13) and (2.14) are identical and independent of , ,  and the household’s
employment status. The problem is rewritten as
max
ˆ
{ˆ + ˆ[(ˆ) ˆˆ] + ˆˆ} (RB)
We can conclude from problem (RB) that every household, irrespective of
 (his real balance in market 3) and  (employment status), will choose the
same real balance ˆ to enter into next period. This conclusion, in turn, im-
plies in that problems (TT) for all the meetings in the decentralized market
are identical and the terms of trade ( ) in the decentralized goods market
are all the same.
12 I employ Nash bargaining as the price determination process because it is standard in
the search literature (say, Shi (1995,1997), Trejos and Wright (1995), Lagos and Wright
(2005)). However, using dierent price determination mechanisms, like price taking, and
price posting with directed search, does not change the conclusions in goods market as
Berensten, Menzio and Wright (2008) have shown and in turn does not change my con-
clusion on labour markets.
13There is a feasibility constraint   . Following Berensten, Menzio and Wright
(2008), we assume for simplicity that this conditions is always slack.
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Assumption 2 We have 1 +   , i.e.   1 .
Assumption 2 means that the money growth rate is higher than what
the Friedman rule would require. To see its application more clearly, we use
the Fisher equation, which links the nominal interest rate and ination in
the long run. The Fisher equation reads,
1 +  =
1 + 

(2.42)
where  is the nominal interest rate. Therefore, Assumption 2 simply means
that   0. while the Friedman rule requires  = 0, i.e.  =   1. As-
sumption 1 makes sure that problem (RB) has meaningful solution as Lagos
and Wright (2005) point out. Then, we only consider the equilibrium of the
economy either in the case 1 +    or the case 1 +  =  but equilibrium
is the limit as 1 +    from above.
Proposition 6 Under Assumption 2, in stationary equilibrium  =  is
always satised;  is the solution to
0()
80()
=


+ 1 (2.43)
where 8 is dened as
8()  4
0() + (1 4)()
40() + 1 4  (2.44)
The household would set its next period real balance at
ˆ = (1 + )8() (2.45)
Proof:14 see Appendix.
(2.43) fully characterizes the equilibrium in decentralized goods market.
Assumption 3 For all   , we have that  0(	)!0(	) is strictly deceasing.
The above assumption is simply imposed to make sure that the solution
to (2.43) is unique. Lagos and Wright (2005) also establish some sucient
conditions for Assumption 3, like that 0(·) is log concave. We then have
the following proposition for the goods market.
Proposition 7 (2.43) is the equilibrium condition in the goods market.
With Assumptions 2 and 3, the solution exists and is unique. Furthermore,
 is decreasing in ; rm’s revenue in market 2, $ =    = 8()   ,
which is clearly increasing in , is also decreasing in .
Proof: see Appendix.
Because $ = 8()  is a function of , we will denote $ as $() latter.
14The same exercise can also be found in Lagos and Wright (2005) and Rocheteau and
Wright (2005).
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2.3.2 Labour Market
We now describe the matching technology in the labour market. In the
present model, where on-the-job search is allowed, the matching outcomes
depend both on the measure of the total labour force and the measure of
rms, the job oer suppliers. As we mentioned in section 2.2.1, the measure
of the total labour force is always 1 and the measure of rms is exogenously
given by 3 . Therefore, we may assume the arrival rate of oers to all
searchers,  , to be an exogenous constant in this section. However, we will
endogenize   and let it depend on 3 latter. In steady sate, we have that
the unemployment rate is constant. Therefore, it is required that new job
matchings equal total layos, i.e.
  = (1 ) (2.46)
We then have the following proposition for the labour market.
Proposition 8 The equilibrium condition in the labour market with exoge-
nous productivity distribution is characterized by equation (2.46). Further-
more, the equilibrium unemployment rate is constant.
2.3.3 Steady State Equilibrium
Proposition 6 and 7 show that goods market equilibrium is solely dened
by  and equilibrium condition (2.43), despite of the situation in labour
market. Similarly, Proposition 8 shows that, labour market equilibrium is
solely dened by  and equilibrium condition (2.46), independently of the
situation in goods market. This leads us to a very simple denition of
equilibrium.
Denition 2 A steady state equilibrium of the economy with exogenous pro-
ductivity distribution is a pair { } that satises equilibrium conditions
(2.43) and (2.46).
Proposition 9 With Assumption 2 and 3, the steady state equilibrium of
the economy with exogenous productivity distribution always exists and is
unique. Furthermore, , the amount of goods traded in decentralized goods
market, is decreasing in interest rate , while unemployment rate  is con-
stant and independent of interest rate .
Although  is constant and independent of interest rate , the wage distri-
bution depends on the interest rate. In next subsection, we will rst express
the wage distribution as a function of the distribution of productivity, and
then we will check its dependence on the interest rate.
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2.3.4 Wage Distribution
We begin by deriving the value of ,( | ), the earning distribution within
a rm, as a function of the distribution of productivity, (·).
Consider a set of workers who are paid less than  by rms with pro-
ductivity level , i.e., ,( | )3(). Workers would leave this set either
because they are laid o, which occurs at rate , or because they receive
a more attractive oer, which grants them a wage increase. From previ-
ous sections we know that only those workers who receive an oer from a
rm with productivity not less than 7( ) will either see their wage raised
above , or leave their type  employer to a more productive rm. Such
oers occur at rate  ¯[7( )]. Therefore, the total measure of the out-
ow of this set is { +  ¯[7( )]},( | )3(). On the inow side,
workers enter the set either from a rm with productivity less than 7( )
or out of unemployment. Also note that, when  is too small (  %(p
¯
 )),
it can only attract the unemployed. When  is higher enough, it could
also attract the workers who work for the rm with productivity lower than
7( ). Then, the number of workers hired by such a rm from rms with
productivity less than 7( ) is   ·3() ·
R (
)
p
¯
,()(), while the
inow of unemployed workers into this category is   ·  · (). Therefore,
the stationary of ,( | ) thus implies, for %0()    %1(),
{+ ¯[7( )]},( | )3 =


  if   %(p
¯
 )
 +  3
R (
)
p
¯
,()() if   %(p
¯
 )
(2.47)
For small values of the wage , specically, for   %(p
¯
 ), the last
integral term vanishes, because 7{%(p
¯
 ) } =p
¯
. Note that only workers
just coming out of unemployment will accept oers in this case. Workers
who have already experienced at least one period in employment have a
reservation wage greater than %(p
¯
 ).
Note that to obtain an expression of ,( | ) in the case   %(p
¯
 ), we
rst need to determine ,(). This is done by considering the stock of workers
employed at all rms with productivity levels less than , which equals
3
R 

p
¯
,()(). This stock is also depleted at rate  +  ¯(), whereas it
is fueled by hiring of unemployed workers. The ow of unemployed workers
hired into rms with productivity less than  is given by  (). Once
again equating inows and outows for the stock of workers at hand leads
to
3
Z 

p
¯
,()() =
 ()
 +  ¯()
 (2.48)
Then, the expression for ,() is obtained by dierentiating both sides of
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(2.48) with respect to , i.e., for   [p
¯
p¯],
,() = ()   
3
 +  
[ +  ¯()]2
(2.49)
and for  p
¯
,
,() = 0
Setting  = 7( ), (2.48) implies, for   %(p
¯
 ) ,
Z (
)
p
¯
,()() =
1
3
 [7( )]
 +  ¯[7( )]
 (2.50)
.Furthermore, for   %(p
¯
 ),
[7( )] = 0 (2.51)
Plugging (2.50) and (2.51) into (2.47) gives us, for %0()    %1(),
,( | ) =


"
#
1
+"
if   %(p
¯
 )
"
#
+"
{+"¯[(
)]}2 if   %(p¯
 )
(2.52)
Also note that, evaluating (2.49) at [7( )] gives us,
[7( )] =


"
#
1
+"
if   %(p
¯
 )
"
#
+"
{+"¯[(
)]}2 if   %(p¯
 )
(2.53)
Comparing (2.52) and (2.53), we have, for %0()    %1(),
,( | ) = [7( )] (2.54)
always holds.
Let )() denote the cdf of the aggregate earnings distribution. )()
hence denotes the proportion of workers earning less than  in the economy.
We have the following proposition for the wage distribution.
Proposition 10 Given xed exogenous productivity distribution () over
[p
¯
p¯], we have that the wage of all the workers comprise the segment [%0(p¯) %1(p¯)].
Furthermore,
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)() =

0 if   %0(p¯)

R p¯
10 ()
+"
{+"¯[()]}2() if %0(p¯)    %0(p¯ )

R p¯
p
¯
+"
{+"¯[()]}2() if %0(p¯
)    %1(p
¯
)

R 11 ()
p
¯
+"
[+"¯()]2
()
+
R p¯
11 ()
+"
{+"¯[()]}2()
if %1(p
¯
)    %1(p¯)
1 if %1(p¯)  
(2.55)
where %0() is dened in (2.40) and %
1
0 is its inverse function; %1() is
dened in (2.17) and %11 is its inverse function; 7( ) is implicitly dened
in (2.32).
Proof: see Appendix.
We have derived the wage accumulative distribution function )(). The
probability density function of the wage distribution can be easily found by
dierentiating )().
We now move to the eect of ination on the wage dispersion. In statis-
tics, the wage dispersion could be indicated by the variance of the wage, the
90th to 10th percentile ratio, or even the ratio of the highest wage to the
lowest wage. Given the complexity of the wage distribution function )(),
it is very hard to derive the the eect of ination on the variance of wage
analytically. However, assuming that the shape of the wage distribution
does not change much when ination changes, it makes sense to check the
eect of ination on the bounds of wages paid in the economy, as done by
Kumar (2008a)1516. Denote by w
¯
and w¯ the lowest and the highest wages,
respectively, paid in the economy. Proposition 10 shows that w
¯
= %0(p¯) and
w¯= %1(p¯).
Proposition 11 Given xed exogenous productivity distribution (), it
holds that w
¯
increases and w¯ decreases when the interest rate  increases.
Proof: see Appendix.
In the present model, both the highest wage and the lowest wage are
paid by the most productive rms. The highest wage decreases when the
15Kumar (2008a) only analyzes the gap between the highest wage and the lowest wage.
The present model manages to analyze them separately.
16 I leave the analysis of other wage dispersion indicators, such as variance of wage, to
future numerical exercises.
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interest rate  increases. The reason is as follows. We use a a micro-founded
model of money to make the money essential in the economy, therefore the
goods market reach the rst optimal when central bank set the interest rate
equals to zero, i.e., the Friedman rule. When the interest rate increases,
there will be more distortion in the goods market, which means that the
rms will suer the prot loss. We know that the highest wage in the
economy is the wage level which make the most productive rm to obtain
zero prot and the prot loss reduces this zero-prot wage level. Therefore,
a rise of the ination rate reduces the highest wage level. The fact that
the lowest wage increases when the interest rate  increases, shows that
the reservation wage for the unemployed increases. That is because the
decrease of the highest wage that the rm could pay reduce the prospects
of wage rising and make the working opportunities less attractive for the
unemployed. Therefore, the unemployed require a higher reservation wage
to compensate them for home production. In fact, the same logic also holds
for the wage dispersion with in any rm. We claim that the wage dispersion
within a rm become smaller when the interest rate becomes higher. Then,
given the exogenous productivity distribution, we reinforce the conclusion,
(which is implied by Proposition 11 from an increasing lower bound and a
decreasing upper bound) that higher ination causes less wage dispersion in
general.
Obviously, increasing w
¯
and decreasing w¯ also implies some other dis-
persion indications, such as that w¯-w
¯
or w¯/w
¯
, also decrease unambiguously.
We also want to compare our conclusion here with those in Kumar
(2008a). In fact, our conclusion that an increase of ination causes less
dispersion within a rm is equivalent to that it causes smaller dispersion in
general when there is no productivity dispersion in Kumar (2008a). How-
ever, our channels are not the same. The rise of ination makes all the rms’
producing activities less protable relative to home production, which has
two consequences in the present model. Firstly, it narrows the gap between
the wage income and home production, which causes the highest wage to
decrease in the present model, but results in an increase of the reservation
wage in Kumar (2008a). Secondly, it reduces the room of wage increase
and in turn increases the reservation wage of the unemployed in the present
model. The second eect of rising ination in the current study is a novelty.
When we assume the productivity distribution to be exogenous, a con-
stant unemployment rate is reached. In the next two sections, We would like
to endogenize the productivity distribution to study the eect of ination on
the productivity distribution and on wage dispersion. Moreover, as we will
see in the next sections, endogenizing the productivity distribution makes
the unemployment rate positively depending on the ination rate, which is
consistent with previous theoretical works about ination and unemploy-
ment in the long run, such as Berentsen, Menzio and Wright (2008).
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2.4 Equilibriumwith Endogenous Productivity Dis-
tribution
We adopt the idea of Acemoglu and Shimer (2000) of endogenous produc-
tivity dispersion to our model. More specically, we assume that a rm’s
productivity follows from its investment choices such that the equilibrium
productivity dispersion arises from the rms’ dispersed investment choices.
Besides that, the optimization decisions of households as well as the wage
setting rules for rms after investment choices are exactly the same as we
have depicted in section 2.2.2 and 2.2.3. Finally, the equilibrium conditions
for the goods market also hold as in section 2.3.1.
2.4.1 Investment and Productivity
We assume from now on that the productivity  of a rm depends on its
investment decision, which is made before entering into the labour market,
and that the productivity  is xed during its operation. More specically,
a rm with productivity  must pay a periodic cost #9() to keep its pro-
ductivity level, where # is a positive constant and 9() is assumed to satisfy:
9(0) = 9 0(0) = 0 and for all   0, 9()  0; 9 0()  0; 9 00()  0. The
latter property of 9(·) means that the cost of productivity investment is in-
creasing with respect to productivity level and also convex; while the former
property is imposed to ensure the existence of equilibrium without lose of
generality.
Some explanations must be made concerning the above form of the pro-
ductivity investment cost. Firstly, we assume that the costs are paid pe-
riodically instead of being paid once and for all when the rm is entering
into the market, following Postel-Vinay and Robin (2002a). The reason is
that employee dynamics within a rm is too complicated to trace in both
models such that the prot function of a rm and the free entry condition,
which is important to pin down the measure of rms latter, could only be
computed and imposed in periodic form in steady state. Secondly, concern-
ing the nature of such productivity investment cost, Postel-Vinay and Robin
(2002a) ascribe it as the rental cost of capital used in the producing activity
follows a Cobb-Douglas production function form. Therefore, their periodic
productivity investment cost is of the form of 281(), where 2 is a constant
exogenous interest rate and 81(·) is the inverse function of Cobb-Douglas
production function in per capita form. We would like to adopt their expla-
nation on the source of productivity investment cost, but can not do so with
an endogenous interest rate 2 = 1 directly. Instead, we have to exclude
capital from our economy because otherwise both capital and at money
can serve as the medium of exchange in the goods market and then capital
holdings, which could inuence the term of trade in the goods market, make
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the analysis much more complicated17. Therefore, we simply assume that
#9() is the cost of using such a production technology and no private agent
benets from it. Thirdly, the productivity investment cost depends only
on the productivity level but not on the scale of labour input of the rm,
still following Postel-Vinay and Robin (2002a). Our explanation is that the
technology modeled in the present study is merely a constant returns to
labour technology. Once a rm gets the technology, it could be used for any
employee within the rm at no cost.
Before moving on, let us derive the expression of (). Note rst, that the
productivity investment decision is made before the rm enters the market.
Therefore, our derivation of the wage distribution for a given productivity
distribution is still valid for this section, i.e., (2.47) to (2.55) in section 2.3.4
also hold for the present case of an endogenous productivity distribution.
Lemma 12
() =
Z 

$
()[1 +
 ¯()
1 (1 ) ] (2.56)
Proof: see Appendix.
Given the specication of the productivity investment cost and (), we
can now begin to derive the distribution of productivity (). Denote the
periodic prot of a rm with productivity investment decision, , as (),
therefore,
() = () #9()
In equilibrium, all rms must make the same (maximal) prot, say .
Thus, the following holds in equilibrium:
() #9() = , if   [p
¯
 p¯] (2.57)
() #9()  , otherwise. (2.58)
Since ()  #9() is a constant over the support [p
¯
p¯], and () is
dierentiable as Lemma 12 shows, it is therefore true that, when   [p
¯
p¯],
0() #9 0() = 0 (2.59)
Combining (2.56) and (2.59) implies
()[1 +
 ¯()
1 (1 ) ] = #9
0() (2.60)
Plugging () from (2.49) into (2.60) gives us,
 
3
 +  
[ +  ¯()]2
[1 +
 ¯()
1 (1 ) ] = #9
0() (2.61)
17See Lagos and Rocheteau (2008) and others for detailed discussion.
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We need to know  , , and 3 to determine the shape of (·). These
variables are discussed in next subsection. We also need to impose two
conditions concerning the denition of (·) to determine the lower and upper
bound of . By denition,
¯(p
¯
) = 1
¯(p¯) = 0
When (2.61) is evaluated at  =p
¯
and  =p¯, we get
 
3
1
 +  
[1 +
 
1 (1 ) ] = #9
0(p
¯
) (2.62)
 
3
 +  
2
= #9 0(p¯) (2.63)
2.4.2 Labour Market
We now describe the matching technology in the labour market. In this
section, the measure of rms, 3 , is endogenously determined in equilibrium.
In section 2.2.1, we assumed that   depend on 3 . Therefore, from now on,
  becomes endogenous. Following Mortensen (2003), we assume18 that,
  =  3 (2.64)
where  is a positive constant.
In steady state, the unemployment rate is constant. Therefore, it is
required that new job matchings equal total layos and (39) still holds here.
The last condition required for labour market clearing is the free entry
condition, which pins down the measure of rms. In the long run competitive
economy, free entry and exit ensure that all the competing rms make zero
prot, i.e.,
 = 0 (2.65)
We then have the following proposition for the labour market.
Proposition 13 The equilibrium condition in labour market with endoge-
nous productivity distribution can be characterized by two equations for the
unemployment rate  and the lower bound of productivity p
¯
,
 
1 $ = p¯ 
9(p
¯
)
9 0(p
¯
)
 (2.66)
18 In a similar continuous time setting, Mortensen (2003) (Chapter2.2, page 38-39) clams
that the arrival rate of oers for the unemployed follows a Poisson process with an arrival
rate approximating to the rm-household ratio (it equals  in my case), when all the
rms post their jobs oers, which are received by a particular worker pure randomly. In
the current discrete time setting, I simply set the oer arriving probability is linear to
the Poisson process arriving rate, just like other applications of labour market search and
matching model in discrete time setting, say, Shi (1998), Berentsen, Menzio and Wright
(2008) and so on.
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(1 ) 2
[1 (1 )] +
 
1 (1 ) = #9
0(p
¯
) (2.67)
The other labour market variables can be expressed by  and p
¯
:
3 =

 
(
1

 1) (2.68)
  =
 

   (2.69)
Furthermore, the upper bound of productivity p¯ is the unique solution to,
 

= #9 0(p¯) (2.70)
Proof: see Appendix.
2.4.3 Steady State Equilibrium
Proposition 6 and 7 show that goods market equilibrium is solely dened
by  and equilibrium condition (2.43), independently of the situation in the
labour market. Firms’ revenue in market 2, $() is the link between the
labour market and the goods market. This suggests the following denition.
Denition 3 A steady state equilibrium of the economy with endogenous
productivity distribution is a triple { p
¯
} such that i) { p
¯
} satises
equilibrium conditions (2.43), (2.66) and (2.67); ii) (2.58) holds, i.e., no
rm has an incentive to enter into the market with   [p
¯
p¯].
Before moving on to the existence and uniqueness of the equilibrium,
we need to prove the following Lemma about the properties of equilibrium
conditions in the labour market.
Lemma 14 Given that $() is constant, the locus of points of (p
¯
) dened
by (2.66) is downward sloping and (2.66) shifts up if $() goes down. The
locus dened by (2.67) slopes upward in ( p
¯
) space and does not shift when
$() changes.
Proof: see Appendix.
Since  is uniquely determined by (2.43), and is independent of the sit-
uation in labour market, the above Lemma implies that  and p
¯
are also
uniquely determined by (2.66) and (2.67). Therefore, to establish the ex-
istence and uniqueness of the equilibrium, we only need to consider the
stability condition (2.58) to ensure that no rm would unilaterally devi-
ate from the productivity investment strategy   [p
¯
p¯]. To this end, we
establish the following lemma.
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Lemma 15 Given the labour market equilibrium conditions hold, (2.58) al-
ways holds.
Proof: see Appendix.
Henceforth, we have established the existence and uniqueness of the
steady state equilibrium. Now we study the properties of equilibrium when
the interest rate changes. The eect of interest rate changes on  is clear as
we proved in Proposition 7,  and $() become smaller when  goes up. By
virtue of Lemma 14, we can draw the curves of (2.66) and (2.67) in a (p
¯
)
space.
 u
p ¯
equ. (2.67)
equ. (2.66)
Graph 2.1: The joint determination of  and p
¯
It has been shown in Lemma 14 that when $() becomes smaller because
of ’s increasing, then, curve (2.67) does not move and curve (2.66) goes up.
We then conclude that  becomes larger, i.e.   0 and p¯
becomes larger
i.e.
p
¯  0.
So with endogenous productivity distribution, we conrm the conclusion
in Berentsen, Menzio and Wright (2008), namely that a higher interest rate
or a higher ination rate leads to a higher unemployment rate in the long
run; the Phillips Curve slopes upward.
To summarize, we have established the following results.
Proposition 16 With Assumption 2 and 3, the steady state equilibrium
always exist and is unique. Furthermore, , the amount of goods traded in
the decentralized goods market, is decreasing in the interest rate , while the
lower bound of productivity p
¯
and the unemployment rate  are increasing
in , in the steady state equilibrium.
2.5 Technology, Wage Dispersion and Ination
We will now study the eect of ination on technology dispersion and its
further eect on wage dispersion. Like in section 2.3.4, we only check the
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lower and upper bounds of productivity and wage distributions, while other
indicators of dispersion are left to future numerical exercises.
Proposition 17 In the steady state equilibrium with endogenous productiv-
ity distribution, a rise of ination makes rms’ productivity less dispersive
in the sense that the lower bound of productivity p
¯
rises while the upper
bound of productivity p¯ is unchanged.
The above proposition follows directly from Proposition 16 and the fact
that no other endogenous variables appears in equation (2.70) determining
the upper bound of productivity.
The intuition for Proposition 17 is fairly clear. When the interest rate
increases, it is more costly for the buyers to hold money. Therefore, it
is hard for the rms to sell products and a rise of ination makes all the
rms less protable in the decentralized goods market. Thus, the rms with
the lowest productivity are driven out of the economy as they make negative
prot now and only the rms with higher productivity are left. Furthermore,
the highest productivity depends on the investment cost form and is thus
independent of the ination rate and the prot earned in the decentralized
goods market.
Proposition 18 In the steady state equilibrium with endogenous produc-
tivity distribution, a rise of ination diminishes the wage dispersion in the
sense that the lower bound of wage rises while the upper bound of wages
drops.
Proof: see Appendix.
We claim that there are three eects of higher ination on the equilib-
rium wage dispersion, which are represented by three dierent terms which
show up in the proof of Proposition 18. First of all, the rise of ination
reduces the revenue of rms from the goods market and therefore reduces
the highest (and also higher) wages. This eect is represented by (B.51) and
it is also the reason for higher ination diminishing the wage dispersion in
the case of an exogenous productivity distribution. Second, the reduction of
highest/higher wages means that there is less room for wage rises within the
rm, i.e., it becomes less attractive to work for the rm then to be unem-
ployed. So the reservation wages to compensate their home products, the
unemployment benet, go up. Then we would see the rise of reservation
wages due to this reason, which is represented by second term in (B.58).
This is also the reason for higher ination diminishing the wage dispersion
in the case of an exogenous productivity distribution case. Third, the rise
of ination increases the lower bound of productivity and the gap between
the highest productivity and lowest productivity is narrowed as shown in
Proposition 17. Therefore, it becomes relatively harder for the rms with
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the highest productivity to enroll new workers compared to the case before
the ination has risen. Then we would see the rise of reservation wages due
to this reason, which is represented by term rst term in (B.58). Further-
more, this eect does not exist in the case of an exogenous productivity
distribution.
2.6 Conclusion
We present a tractable model to study the eects of ination on the wage
dispersion due to both productivity dierences and on-the-job the search.
The model contains explicit micro-foundations for money demand and for
unemployment. We rst study the case of an exogenous given productiv-
ity distribution and then the case where the productivity distribution is
determined endogenously. We nd that, for an exogenous productivity dis-
tribution, the wages become less dispersive when ination goes up, in the
sense that the lowest wage rises and the highest wage falls. In the case of
an endogenous productivity distribution case, higher ination reduces the
dispersion of the productivity in the sense that the lowest productivity rises
whereas the highest productivity remains unchanged; the wages also be-
come less dispersive in the same sense as described above. To summarize,
higher ination diminishes the wage dispersion, which is consistent with the
empirical evidence.
We believe that it is desirable and important to nd empirical evidence
on the link between ination and productivity dispersion on the one hand
and wage dispersion on the other. To our best knowledge, there is no such
study. However, this task is beyond the focus of the current study and we
aim to pursue this idea in subsequent research.
Chapter 3
Anticipation, Learning and
Welfare: the Case of
Distortionary Taxation1
3.1 Motivation
Nowadays, scal policy is usually accompanied by legislation and imple-
mentation lags. These lags create a non-negligible span of time between
the announcement and eective date of a scal policy change. This gives
individuals in the economy the opportunity to anticipate the tax changes.
The economic literature denotes this aspect of scal policy either antici-
pated scal policy or scal foresight. From our reading, those two terms are
equivalents and will be used as such.2
When agents anticipate, their resulting actions may to some extent de-
pend on the way they form expectations about the future. The standard
assumption of expectations in economics is perfect-foresight / rational ex-
pectations (RE). This assumption might be questioned. One prominent
deviation of RE that imposes weaker requirements on the agent’s informa-
tion set when making his decisions, is the learning literature (see Evans and
Honkapohja (2001) for the foundations of this approach). The main idea
is that agents form expectations about future values of variables they can-
not observe by engaging in a kind of statistical inference when making their
economic choices.
Although the learning approach has gained signicant popularity in some
1This chapter is a joint work with my colleague Emanuel Gasteiger.
2Recently (2009, p.11) has listed empirical evidence for scal foresight and reempha-
sized the relevance of expectations for sound scal policy. Furthermore, Leeper et al.
(2009) is another good example of empirical evidence of scal foresight. Therein they also
demonstrate the challenges for econometricians that aim to quantify the impact of scal
policy actions and at the same time account adequately for scal foresight.
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areas of macroeconomics, anticipated scal policy has, until recently, been
neglected. A pioneering contribution to studying the consequences of an-
ticipated scal policy when agents learn factor prices, has been made by
Evans et al. (2009). They demonstrate the adaptive constant gain learning
approach in several deterministic economic environments, taking changes in
lump-sum taxation as an example. The choice of a constant gain therein is
motivated by the fact that scal policy moves may state structural change.
First Evans et al. (2009, p.932) consider permanent, temporary and repeated
tax changes in an endowment economy with a balanced-budget policy. The
core message of their results is that under learning, anticipated scal policy
changes have instant eects on key variables as in the perfect foresight case,
but the transition paths are remarkably dierent from the latter. This re-
sult, at least with regard to the volatility of key variables’ time paths may
not come as a surprise. It is well known that constant gain learning causes
excess volatility compared to the case of RE (see Evans and Honkapohja
(2001, p.49) for an illustration). Thereafter, Evans et al. (2009, p.941)
turn attention to the scenario of debt nancing of anticipated scal policy
changes and nd that, given agents understand the structure of government
nancing, the so-called “near Ricardian equivalence” holds under learning.
Finally, Evans et al. (2009, p.944) introduce the adaptive learning approach
to the basic Ramsey model. For an anticipated balanced-budget permanent
tax change they once more conrm that under learning the time paths of key
variables are strikingly dierent from their perfect foresight counterparts.
In subsequent work, Evans et al. (2010) focus on Ricardian equivalence in
the basic Ramsey model with anticipated scal policy under learning. Most
important, Evans et al. (2010, p.8) formally proof that the assumption of
RE is not necessary for the classic Ricardian equivalence result. Further-
more, Evans et al. (2010, p.10) provide new departures from the Ricardian
equivalence proposition. First, if government expenditures are endogenous,
i.e. depend on a scal rule, then Ricardian equivalence holds only under RE
but fails under learning. Second, Ricardian equivalence breaks down, if the
expected interest rates depend on changes in the level of public debt.
Building on the contribution of Evans et al. (2009), we aim to generalize
their analysis of anticipated scal policy under learning into an economy
featuring distortionary taxes and elastic labour supply. More specically,
we derive the dynamic paths of key variables for permanent changes in dis-
tortionary taxes in a deterministic version of the prominent Ramsey model.
In particular we consider permanent changes in distortionary labour income,
capital income and consumption tax in turn. In addition, we examine more
sophisticated scal policy reforms, in the presence of several tax instru-
ments. There are fundamental dierences between lump-sum taxation and
distortionary taxation: a labour income tax under inelastic labour supply
does not aect household margins and therefore causes no distortion, but
under elastic labour supply the labour income tax aects the intra-temporal
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choice between consumption and leisure of the household and may cause
an intra-temporal distortion. Next, a capital income tax has the potential
to cause up to two types of distortion. First, the capital income tax in
any case aects the inter-temporal household Euler equation. In case of
elastic labour supply, the capital income tax also aects the intra-temporal
choice between consumption and leisure of the household due to its distor-
tion of the consumption choice. Finally, a consumption tax may also cause
an inter-temporal distortion by aecting the household Euler equation, but
there is an important dierence compared to capital income taxation. The
consumption tax aects the price of consumption in both periods consid-
ered in the household Euler equation whereas the capital income tax always
aects only the price of next period’s consumption in the household Euler
equation. Loosely speaking, a consumption tax can distort consumption
and investment decision via the household’s Euler equation, only when it
is changed, i.e. time-varying, whereas a capital income tax always causes
distortions in the Ramsey economy. Thus, we may expect that the dynam-
ics of the economy for a capital income tax reform may be fundamentally
dierent from the economic dynamics for a consumption tax reform.3
Furthermore, the assumption of elastic labour supply implies that en-
dogenous variables such as factor prices as well as employment and con-
sumption are not predetermined as in Evans et al. (2009, p.943) or in Evans
et al. (2010), but determined simultaneously in each period.
Next to the analytical derivations, we also calibrate our model and cal-
culate welfare consequences for several policy experiments under perfect
foresight as well as under learning. For this purpose, we make use of the
welfare measure proposed by Lucas (1990) and also applied by Cooley and
Hansen (1992) (for discrete time), which takes into account the whole tran-
sition path between the initial and new steady-states associated with initial
and changed tax rate. Thus, putting it dierently, we ask, to what extent
the excess volatility caused by constant gain learning aects the well-being
of households compared to the perfect foresight case. Using such a measure
of welfare consequences, may even allow comparison of results for learning
dynamics to previous studies such as Cooley and Hansen (1992), Cooley
and Hansen (1992) or Garcia-Milà et al. (2010). All these studies evalu-
ate and rank various distortionary tax reforms according to their welfare
consequences under perfect foresight.
Our main results are as follows. When we assume that agents use adap-
tive learning rules to forecast factor prices, our model predicts oscillatory
dynamic responses to anticipated permanent tax changes. Unfortunately we
cannot isolate an exclusive source of the oscillatory dynamics. Sensitivity
analyses suggest that there are at least two sources. In addition, policy ex-
3Note that a consumption tax may also be a desirable subject of study, as it has special
stability properties. See Giannitsarou (2007) for the details.
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periments indicate that these volatile responses may have a major impact
on the welfare consequences of tax reforms. In particular we consider exper-
iments that improve welfare but do so to a much lower extent under learning
compared to perfect foresight.
Note that our approach links the learning literature to that part of the
public nance literature that is concerned with the welfare consequences of
dierent types of taxation. See Chamley (1981) for an example of a com-
parative statics analysis or Judd (1987) for dierences in unanticipated and
anticipated changes in factor taxes. In addition, there have been studies
in stochastic set-ups, like Cooley and Hansen (1992). With regard to the
implementation of anticipated optimal scal policy an example is Domeij
and Klein (2005) or its extension for public goods and capital by Trabandt
(2007). Moreover, Garcia-Milà et al. (2010) have recently conducted re-
search on welfare consequences of scal policy experiments in the spirit of
Cooley and Hansen (1992) in a heterogeneous agents model.
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows. In Section 3.2
we outline the economic model, derive optimality conditions and detail our
approach of learning. Section 3.3 compares the dynamics with and without
elastic labour supply for the case of lump-sum tax changes. This section
also provides sensitivity analysis for some structural parameters. In Section
3.4 we consider changes in distortionary taxation and compare the resulting
dynamics to the case of lump-sum taxation. The last part of this section
contains the welfare analysis of selected policy experiments. Section 3.5
concludes and points out directions for further research.
3.2 The Model
Our economy is a version of the Ramsey economy outlined in detail in
Ljungqvist and Sargent (2000, p.305). The capital stock 
% evolves according
to the economy-wide resource constraint

%+1 = 	 (
% :%) #%  8% + (1 )
% (3.1)
where 	 (
% :%) is the economy’s production function (equalling output)
showing that the rm sector uses capital 
% and labour :% as inputs to
produce the single good of the economy (see Section 3.2.2 for the details).
Output can either be consumed by households (#%) or the government (8%) or
added to the capital stock. Capital is assumed to depreciate at a constant
rate .
3.2.1 Households
With regard to the household sector, we assume a continuum of households,
where we normalize the size of the economy to unity and each household
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faces the problem
max
&'
;%
( X
%=0
%
£
log(#%) +  log(,¯ :%)
¤)
(3.2)
s.t.

%+1 +
%+1
$%
+ (1 + < &%)#% = (1 < (%)%:% + (1 <)% )2%
% + (1 )
%
+%  < % + % (3.3)
where all variables are in per capita terms. Thus, the variable 
%+1 denotes
the level of capital in period =+ 1 and %+1 is the level of government debt
holdings chosen in period =. Furthermore, 2% is the rental rate of capital
and $% is the gross real interest rate in period =. The level of consumption
chosen in period = is indicated by #%. Next, <•% denotes a distortionary tax
either on consumption, labour income or capital income4. The real wage in
period = is given by % and % = ,¯:% denotes leisure. In consequence, :% is
labour supply of the household. < % is a per capita lump-sum tax and % = 0
is the prot under perfect competition. Furthermore, the parameter   0
measures the elasticity of labour supply.
;% {•} denotes subjective period = expectations for future values of vari-
ables. Households apply this operator, if they do not have perfect foresight.
This assumption is commonly used in the learning literature. Furthermore,
note that we abstract from aggregate uncertainty, i.e. we conduct our analy-
sis in a deterministic economy. Thus, if households do not have perfect fore-
sight, their expectations are so-called point expectations, i.e. agents base
their economic choices on the mean of their expectations, see Evans and
Honkapohja (2001, p.61). In Section 3.2.4 below we outline our concept of
learning. An important aspect of this concept is that forecasts of single vari-
ables are independent of each other. In consequence, we can assume that for
any two variables > and + it is true that ;% {>+ } = ;% {>};% {+ } holds.
Now, we detail the household’s decisions. Each household solves the
Lagrangian
L = ;%
X
%=0
%{log(#%) +  log(,¯ :%)
 %[
%+1 + %+1
$%
+ (1 + < &%)#%  (1 < (%)%:%  (1 <)% )2%
%  (1 )
%
% + < %]}
4We use the symbol • as a placeholder throughout our analysis.
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with rst-order conditions
*L
*#%
: %
©
#1%   %(1 + < &%)
ª
= 0 (3.4)
*L
*
%+1
: % { %}+ %+1;%
n
 %+1
h
(1 ) + (1 <)%+1)2%+1
io
= 0(3.5)
*L
*%+1
: %
© %$1% ª+ %+1;% { %+1} = 0 (3.6)
*L
*:%
: %
n
(,¯ :%)1   %[(1 < (%)%]
o
= 0 (3.7)
From (3.4) and (3.6) we get the household Euler condition
#1% = $%;

%
½
#1%+1
(1 + < &%)
(1 + < &%+1)
¾
 (3.8)
(3.5) and (3.6) yield the no-arbitrage condition for capital and bonds
$% =
h
(1 ) + (1;%
n
<)%+1
o
);% {2%+1}
i
 (3.9)
and from (3.4) and (3.7) we get the consumption leisure trade-o
:% = ,¯ (1 + <
&
%)#%
(1 < (%)%
 (3.10)
3.2.2 Firms
In our economy, there is a unit continuum of rms who compete perfectly.
Each rm in each period = rents capital at given price 2% and labour at given
price % and produces the numeraire good with constant returns to scale
production function
% = 	 (
% :%)
% = .


% :
(1)
%  (3.11)
where   (0 1). The optimal rm behaviour requires that
2% =
*%
*
%
= .
1% :
1
%  (3.12)
as well as
% =
*%
*:%
= .(1 )
% :%  (3.13)
i.e. each production factor earns its marginal product. Finally, we have the
per capita national income identity
% = 2%
% + %:%
% = %  2%
%  %:% = 0 (3.14)
which means zero prots, as one can expect from perfect competition.
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3.2.3 Government
The government nances its expenses on goods and debt repayment by tax
revenues and the issuance of new bonds in each period =
8% + % = <
&
%#% + <
(
%%:% + <
)
% 2%
% + < % +
%+1
$%

For the remainder, we will assume that the government operates a balanced-
budget rule in each period =, thus tax revenues will fully cover expenses
such that bonds are in zero net supply as a direct consequence. Thus the
government sets 8% < &%  <
(
% <
)
% and < % constrained by
8% = <
&
%#% + <
(
%%:% + <
)
% 2%
% + < % (3.15)
in each period =.
3.2.4 Learning
Now, we aim to detail our concept of learning that was elaborated in Evans
et al. (2009, p.943). For completeness we restate the crucial assumptions
on learning. Under learning, households are supposed to know the entire
history of endogenous variables. They observe the current period value
of exogenous variables and they know the state variables. Furthermore,
they know the structure of the economy with regard to the scal policy
sector. Agents understand the implications of the announced policy change
for the government budget constraint. They are also convinced that the
intertemporal government budget constraint will always hold (see Evans et
al. (2009, p.944)). Agents then forecast factor prices such as interest rates
and wages 2%+*(=) 

%+*(=) ?  1, by making use of constant-gain steady-
state adaptive learning rules5
2%+*(=) = 2
(=) /: %+*(=) = 
(=) (3.16)
where
2(=) = 2(= 1) + ((2%1  2(= 1))
(3.17)
(=) = (= 1) + ((%1  (= 1))
5Here we apply the same short-hand notation as Evans et al. (2009). Thus for any
variable say , its period  expected future value in period  +  derived by a learning
rule may either be denoted  {+} or equivalently 	+(). An additional notation we
introduce is 
+() which denotes the agent’s planned choice of the variable  in period
+  based on expected values formed via the learning rule in period .
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where 0  (  1 is the gain parameter.6 Our choice of this specic learning
rule is motivated by two well known arguments in the learning literature.
First, as Evans and Honkapohja (2001, p.332) outline, choosing a constant
gain learning rule is the appropriate choice for agents, when they are aware
of structural change, as in such a learning rule agents discount past data
exponentially. Note that rules (3.17) are equivalent to 2(=) = (
P
=0(1 
()2%1 and (=) = (
P
=0(1  ()%1. Second, the timing of the
learning rule, i.e. that agents’ update in period = uses data up to period
=1, is chosen in order to avoid simultaneity between 2(=) and 2% as well as
(=) and % (see for example Evans and Honkapohja (2001, p.51)). Think
of simultaneity in this context as a situation in which agents’ expectations
aect current values of aggregate endogenous variables and vice versa, which
may potentially introduce some strategic behaviour.
Such a learning rule yields a sequence of so-called temporary equilib-
ria, which consist of sequences of (planned) time paths for all endogenous
variables. These sequences satisfy the learning rule above, the expectation
history, household and rm optimality conditions, the government budget
constraint and the economy-wide resource constraint given the exogenous
variables as well as the current stock of capital in each period. These plans
are revisited and potentially altered in each period after expectations have
been updated.
3.3 Base Case: Lump-Sum Tax
Before pursuing our core issue, i.e. the case of distortionary taxation, we
would like to illustrate the applied methodology for the case of lump-sum
taxation for two reasons: rst, we want to illustrate the consequences of
the introduction of elastic labour supply compared to the case of inelastic
labour supply as assumed in Evans et al. (2009, p.943) and its eect on the
dynamic paths of the key variables such as consumption and capital, given
their calibration (see Table 3.1 below); second, below in Subsection 3.3.2, we
aim to present a sensitivity analysis for the very basic version of the model
under examination.
Let us now derive the dynamic paths under learning for an anticipated
lump-sum tax change. Consequently we assume all other types of taxation
away, i.e. < &% = <
(
% = <
)
% = 0. The Euler equation (3.8) is standard
#1% = (#

%+1(=))
1 £(1 ) + 2%+1(=)¤
6The gain parameter measures the responsiveness of the forecast to new observations,
see Evans and Honkapohja (2001, p.18). Be aware that in our model the gain parameter
is exogenous. See Branch and Evans (2007) for a recent example where agents can choose
the gain parameter.
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and forward substitution of this yields
#%+*(=) = 
*@%%+*(=)#% (3.18)
where we dene @%%+*(=)  *=1[(1  ) + 2%+(=)]. One can think of this
term as “expectations of the interest rate factor @%%+* at time =” (see Evans
et al. (2009, p.933)). Next, we notice that the consumption leisure trade-o
in this case is
:% = ,¯ #%
%
 (3.19)
Given the adequate transversality condition for capital
lim
+ 7
¡
@%%++ (=)
¢1

%+++1(=) = 0 (3.20)
the inter-temporal budget constraint of the consumer is
#% +
X
*=1
1
@%%+*(=)
#%+*(=) = [(1 ) + 2%]
% + %:%  < %
+
X
*=1
1
@%%+*(=)
h
%+*(=):

%+*(=) < %+*(=)
i

which by the virtue of (3.18) and (3.19) yields
#%
(1 + )
(1 ) = [(1 ) + 2%]
% + %,¯ < %
+
X
*=1
1
@%%+*(=)
%+*(=),¯| {z }
,-1

X
*=1
1
@%%+*(=)
< %+*(=)| {z }
,+1
 (3.21)
Equations (3.12) and (3.13) hold for rms. Finally, government faces the
constraint
8% = < % (3.22)
in each period = and the economy-wide resource constraint is given by (3.1).
We now need to think about the policy experiment we will study. We
are looking at a scenario of a credible permanent change in taxes announced
at the outset of period = = 1 and eective from period = = A onwards. In
particular a tax change from <0 to <1 at some point in time A. The dynamics
under perfect foresight are standard.7 Under learning we can directly follow
Evans et al. (2009, p.943). The crucial step is to calculate the innite sums
7Ljungqvist and Sargent (2000, p.305) illustrate the analytical derivations and numer-
ical simulation alternatives for the perfect foresight case. We will simply make use of
the DYNARE toolbox throughout all calculations to compute dynamics under perfect
foresight. Note that this toolbox employs linearization methods.
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on the right-hand side of (3.21), i.e. '1 and 'A1. Directly following the
appendix in Evans et al. (2009, p.951) we calculate
'1 =
(=),¯
2(=)   (3.23)
With regard to 'A1, we have8
'A1 =
<0
2(=)  + (<1  <0)
[(1 ) + 2(=)]%+

1 [(1 ) + 2(=)]1 (3.24)
for 1  =  A and
'A1 =
<1
2(=)   (3.25)
for =  A. From (3.21) follows that we have
#% =
(1 )
(1 + )
{[(1 ) + 2%]
% + %,¯ <0 + 
(=),¯
2(=) 
 <0
2(=)   (<1  <0)
[(1 ) + 2(=)]%+

1 [(1 ) + 2(=)]1 } (3.26)
for 1  =  A and
#% =
(1 )
(1 + )

[(1 ) + 2%]
% + %,¯ <1 + 
(=),¯
2(=)  
<1
2(=) 
¸
(3.27)
for =  A. Given a calibration, we can then compute the dynamics of
consumption and other endogenous variables.
3.3.1 Inelastic Labour Supply vs. Elastic Labour Supply
We believe that it is of importance to use a model that features elastic labour
supply in order to calculate welfare implications of scal policy reforms ade-
quately. Completely inelastic labour supply is a quite unrealistic assumption
itself and at least some moderately elastic labour supply should be consid-
ered. Moreover, it implies that agents’ choices of current period endogenous
variables are in fact predetermined as is pointed out in Evans et al. (2009,
p.944). In order to illustrate dierences in the dynamics of endogenous vari-
ables based on the assumption of inelastic and elastic labour supply, we
return to the simulation exercise of Evans et al. (2009, p.943). Note that
< &% = <
(
% = <
)
% =  = 0 and  = 0 imply that :% = ,¯ (i.e. inelastic labour
supply) for all = (see equation (3.19)). Therefore, we are exactly in the same
scenario as in Evans et al. (2009, p.943). Although we do not fully agree
with the calibration of Evans et al. (2009), we will stick to their calibration
8See Appendix C.1 for details on derivations.
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in this subsection to keep our results comparable. We will indicate, when we
deviate from their calibration. The basic reason for this disagreement is the
combination of parameters  = 095 and A = 20. These parameter choices
imply that a government, which in reality is usually in charge of a legislation
period of four to six years, may announce a tax policy change that will be
eective in 20 years’ time. From our perception of political execution and
our condence in scal policy makers’ ability to commit, this appears to be
unrealistic in most cases. Nevertheless, we would like to mention, that in
all the subsequent numerical illustrations of our analytical derivations, we
experienced severe diculties in nding calibrations that could yield con-
vergence for the dynamics under learning. Our experience is, that it is quite
a dicult task, to perfectly calibrate the model to empirically estimated
structural parameters and achieve convergence, at least with the numerical
methods, we have at our disposal.
For the moment, we calibrate the model according to Table 3.1 below.
The policy experiment considered in Evans et al. (2009, p.943) is a perma-
Parameter Value Parameter Value
 100  000
 033 
 20
 095  010
Table 3.1: Parameters similar as in Evans et al. (2009, p.945)
nent increase in government purchases from 80 = <0 = 09 to 81 = <1 = 11
that is announced credibly in period = = 1 and will be eective from pe-
riod A = 20 onwards. It is assumed that the economy is in steady-state
in period = = 0. Simulations in Evans et al. (2009, p.943) for consump-
tion and capital are recalculated (with  = 0 ,¯ = 05182) and displayed
in Figures 3.1(a) and 3.1(b) below. Furthermore, Figures 3.1(c) and 3.1(d)
exhibit the dynamics for elastic labour supply with  = 200 and ,¯ = 100,
values that match :0 = 05182 and 80 = 09 in this set-up.9Consumption
(a) and capital (b) dynamics under learning (solid curve) and perfect fore-
sight (dashed curve) with inelastic labour supply as in Evans et al. (2009)
as well as consumption (c) and capital (d) dynamics under learning (solid
curve) and perfect foresight (dashed curve) with elastic labour supply. The
dotted horizontal line indicates the (new) steady state, the dotted vertical
line indicates period A.
Two distinct features emerge from Figure 3.1. First, when we compare
the dynamic paths of consumption (as well as capital) under perfect fore-
sight and learning, they are dierent from each other no matter with or
9Note that 0 = 05182 corresponds to 1244 hours per day. This appears to be quite
unrealistic, but we choose those numbers in order to achieve both comparable magnitudes
in Figure 3.1 below as well as convergence under learning.
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Figure 3.1: Consumption (a) and capital (b) dynamics under learning (solid
curve) and perfect foresight (dashed curve) with inelastic labour supply as
in Evans et al. (2009, p.943) as well as consumption (c) and capital (d)
dynamics under learning (solid curve) and perfect foresight (dashed curve)
with elastic labour supply. The dotted horizontal line indicates the (new)
steady state, the dotted vertical line indicates period A.
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without elastic labour supply. Therefore, it may be quite important to con-
sider learning when evaluating scal policies as learning is a more realistic
assumption of human behaviour from our point of view.10 Second, obviously
the learning paths in Figures 3.1(a) and 3.1(b) for inelastic labour supply are
strikingly dierent to the ones under elastic labour supply in Figures 3.1(c)
and 3.1(d). In particular, elastic labour supply yields much more volatility
in the time paths of consumption and capital (as well as other variables
in the model) compared to the inelastic labour supply case. In fact, the
variables oscillate around their steady-state until they converge to it. This
implies, that the tax reforms may have dierent welfare implications in an
economy with elastic labour supply, when one compares the case of perfect
foresight against the case of learning.
From our point of view, possible reasons for the signicant dierences
in the dynamics under learning between elastic and inelastic labour sup-
ply could be as follows. Consider agents’ behaviour under perfect foresight.
Agents x their current and future choices once and for all. They do not
form expectations about current and future factor prices. Second, agents
without perfect foresight forecast current period factor prices in each pe-
riod. Therefore, they make an update of their expectations of factor prices.
Thereby agents also make an expectational error. Based on their updated
expectations of factor prices they revise current and planned future choices
of variables in each period. In addition, actual factor prices in that period
are determined based on the agents updated expectations of factor prices.
Be aware that the rst and the second point above are true for inelastic
labour supply as well as elastic labour supply. So the learning itself cannot
explain the dierences in the dynamics. Furthermore, note that with in-
elastic labour supply, factor prices are predetermined, whereas with elastic
labour supply factor prices are free variables. Moreover, with elastic labour
supply, households can react to structural changes by substitution of con-
sumption for leisure or vice versa in order to sustain a certain level of utility.
For agents with perfect foresight nothing really changes when factor prices
are no longer predetermined. Now, as labour supply is elastic, they choose
a plan for leisure in addition to their plan for consumption, but they still
do that in a once and for all manner. Transition paths should be smooth as
before. But for agents that use adaptive learning, it might make a dierence.
In particular, we suspect that the expectational error could be larger in the
case in which factor prices are no longer predetermined. This could lead
to more volatility in the expectations of factor prices which translates into
higher volatility of actual factor prices as well as consumption and leisure
choices. We suggest that the correction of the expectational error in each
period could explain the oscillations.
10This is the core result of Evans et al. (2009).
70 CHAPTER 3. ANTICIPATION, LEARNING AND WELFARE
3.3.2 Sensitivity Analysis
Compared to the previous literature on welfare evaluation of tax reforms,
our learning approach introduces two additional structural parameters. One
is (, the gain parameter and a second one is A, the period, in which the
pre-announced tax change becomes eective. Therefore, we are interested
in how these two parameters aect the dynamic properties of the model.
Sensitivity Analysis for the Gain Parameter
No matter what calibration, one always has to choose a gain parameter (
in the adaptive learning literature. In this subsection we would therefore
like to illustrate the consequences of dierent choices of the gain parameter.
The sole empirical estimate we are aware of is provided by Milani (2007,
p.2074) for quarterly frequency and is ( = 00183. This number indicates
that agents use approximately 1( 	 55 quarters of data. But a reason to
be cautious to use the estimate of Milani (2007, p.2074) is that it is based
on a data set containing output, ination and the nominal interest rate,
whereas in our setting agents forecast the rental rate of capital and the real
wage. Next, Milani (2007, p.2074) mentions that for constant gain learning
a range of (  [001 003] is commonly used. Evans and Honkapohja (2009,
p.154) note a range of (  [001 006] as known estimates.
Below we will present sensitivity of the dynamics under learning for
(  {001 002 005 008 010}. We do so for the original numerical analysis
of Evans et al. (2009, p.943) (,¯ = 100,  = 000), as in this case, there is
inelastic labour supply and we can focus solely on the possible uctuations
introduced by varying the gain parameter (. Note that the two thick lines
in Figures 3.2(a) and 3.2(b) exactly replicate the Figures 8 and 9 in Evans
et al. (2009, p.943).
In Figure 3.2(a) we observe that the smaller the gain (, the smaller
the increase in consumption until the period of the tax change A (after
the initial drop). Furthermore, as we recognize from Figure 3.2(b), the
smaller the gain (, the larger the increase in capital accumulation until the
period of the tax change A. However, in both Figure 3.2(a) and 3.2(b), we
observe that with decreasing ( the dynamics uctuate around the steady-
state with increasing amplitude and it takes an increasing number of periods
to converge to the steady-state. These observations are partly at odds with
what Evans and Honkapohja (2001, p.332) report: “a larger gain is better at
tracking changes but at the cost of a larger variance”. In our case it holds,
that, the smaller the gain, the larger the volatility.
Summing up, we nd that for the parameter range considered in this
sensitivity analysis, the choice of the gain parameter ( is not crucial for the
shape of the dynamic response.
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Figure 3.2: Consumption (a) and capital (b) dynamics under learning and
perfect foresight with inelastic labour supply as in Evans et al. (2009, p.943)
for alternating values of (. The dotted horizontal line indicates the (new)
steady state, the dotted vertical line indicates period A.
Sensitivity Analysis for the Implementation Date
Another issue that may be of interest is the implementation date A. As
mentioned above a tax policy change that is going to be eective in 20
years time appears to be unrealistic from our point of view. Therefore, we
examine sensitivity of dynamics under learning for various implementation
dates, in particular A  {3 10 20}. Figures 3.3(a) and 3.3(b) below display
the results.
In Figure 3.3(a) we observe that the shorter the distance between the an-
nouncement date and implementation date of the tax change, the higher the
initial drop in consumption and the lower the increase in consumption until
the implementation date thereafter. Focusing on capital, in Figure 3.3(b) we
observe that with decreasing distance between the announcement date and
implementation date of the tax change, the level that capital reaches until
the implementation date, is also lower. Finally, for implementation in three
years time, i.e. A = 3, learning dynamics are not signicantly dierent from
A  {10 20}, but lower in scale. Overall, we observe that the shorter the
distance between announcement date and implementation date of the tax
change, the earlier the learning dynamics approach the steady-state, but, at
least for the parameter range considered herein, the nature of dynamics is
not seriously aected.
Thus, we learn that in the subsequent numerical analysis, next to the
elasticity of labour supply  (and the commonly known candidate parame-
ters  and ), the choice of the gain parameter ( as well as the implementa-
tion date A may also be crucial in achieving convergence on the one hand
and determining the magnitude of volatility of the dynamics on the other
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Figure 3.3: Consumption (a) and capital (b) dynamics under learning with
inelastic labour supply as in Evans et al. (2009, p.943) for alternating values
of A. The dotted horizontal line indicates the (new) steady state, the dotted
vertical line indicates period A = 20.
hand. But these choices may not aect the general nature of the dynamics.
Furthermore, our experience with  and  suggests that they strongly aect
the scale of results, next to their impact on convergence.
In order to summarize, there are three important insights from the analy-
sis above. First, there are at least qualitative dierences between the case of
inelastic labour supply ( = 0) and elastic labour supply (  0). Therefore,
if one regards the latter assumption as more realistic, a model that allows
for elastic labour supply is a more appropriate framework to study antici-
pated scal policy under learning. Second, our sensitivity analysis suggests
that the choice of the gain parameters ( and the implementation date A
does not aect the nature of transition paths so we consider ourselves free
to choose any of the values considered in the sensitivity analysis.11 Finally
and most notably, we observed at least a qualitative dierence in the dy-
namics under learning compared to the dynamics under perfect foresight.
The former appear to be much more volatile than the latter. This stylized
fact, from our point of view, justies the quantication and comparison of
welfare cost of anticipated scal policy reforms under learning and under
perfect foresight. In order to be able to mimic, at least to some extent, a
realistic scal policy reform, we will introduce distortionary taxes. Before
we look at complex scal policy reforms, we qualitatively inspect isolated
changes in distortionary taxes and the resulting dynamics for each type of
tax. Thereafter, we analyze more sophisticated scal policy reforms with
regard to their welfare costs in a realistic calibration.
11 In particular, in the subsequent analysis, we will choose  = 008 and 
 = 8, which
will correspond to 8 quarters.
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3.4 The Case of Distortionary Taxation
After the base case of lump-sum taxation, we now study the case of distor-
tionary taxes. In the remainder, we will assume elastic labour supply. We
rst characterize the dynamics for a permanent change in a single distor-
tionary tax. This follows closely from Evans et al. (2009, p.943) similar to
the last section. Next, we simulate the dynamic paths of the economy for a
change in each type of distortionary tax in turn, given there are no other tax
instruments. We inspect the associated dynamics for each distortionary tax
with regard to qualitative dierences compared to the lump-sum tax and the
other distortionary taxes. Thereafter, in Section 3.4.4 below, we derive the
dynamic paths of the economy in presence of all types of taxes considered in
this economy. Moreover, we evaluate some specic tax reforms with regard
to welfare, given our suggested calibration.
3.4.1 Labour Income Tax
Let us now assume that < &% = <
)
% = < % = 0 for all = and <
(
%  [0 1]. The Euler
equation (3.8) is standard and forward substitution again yields (3.18). Next
we notice that the consumption leisure trade-o in this case is
:% = ,¯ #%
(1 < (%)%
 (3.28)
Given the adequate transversality condition for capital (3.20), the inter-
temporal budget constraint of the consumer is
#% +
X
*=1
1
@%%+*(=)
#%+*(=) = [(1 ) + 2%]
% + (1 < (%)%:%
+
X
*=1
1
@%%+*(=)
h
(1 < (%+*(=))%+*(=):%+*(=)
i

Given (3.18) and (3.28) we can rewrite the latter as
#%
(1 + )
(1 ) = [(1 ) + 2%]
% + (1 <
(
%)%,¯
+
X
*=1
1
@%%+*(=)
h
(1 < (%+*(=))%+*(=),¯
i
 (3.29)
For rms, nothing changes compared to the base case in Section 3.3. Finally,
the government now faces the constraint
8% = <
(
%%:% (3.30)
in each period = and the economy-wide resource constraint is given by (3.1).
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We now once more consider the scenario of a credible permanent change
in the tax rate announced in period = = 1 and eective from period = = A
onwards. In particular, the labour income tax is changed from < (0 to <
(
1
at some point in time A. The dynamics under perfect foresight are again
standard. Under learning we can directly follow Evans et al. (2009, p.943).
The crucial step is to calculate the innite sums on the right-hand side of
(3.29). That is
X
*=1
1
@%%+*(=)
h
(1 < (%+*(=))%+*(=),¯
i
=
X
*=1
1
@%%+*(=)
%+*(=),¯

X
*=1
1
@%%+*(=)
< (%+*(=)

%+*(=),¯
= '1  'A2
Given (3.16) and (3.17), we get the term '1 =
	(%).¯
/	(%) as before in Section
3.3. With regard to 'A2, for 1  =  A we calculate12
'A2 = 
(=),¯

< (0
2(=)  +
³
< (1  < (0
´ [(1 ) + 2(=)]%+

1 [(1 ) + 2(=)]1
¸
(3.31)
and for =  A we calculate
'A2 =
< (1 
(=),¯
2(=)   (3.32)
Given (3.29), it follows that we have
#% =
(1 )
(1 + )
[[(1 ) + 2%]
% + (1 < (0)%,¯+ (1 < (0)
(=),¯
2(=) 
(=),¯(< (1  < (0)
[(1 ) + 2(=)]%+

1 [(1 ) + 2(=)]1 ] (3.33)
for 1  =  A and
#% =
(1 )
(1 + )

[(1 ) + 2%]
% + (1 < (1)%,¯+ (1 < (1)
(=),¯
2(=) 
¸
 (3.34)
for =  A. Given a calibration, we are then able to compute the dynamics
of consumption and other endogenous variables.
Now let us return to the numerical example. Here we calibrate the model
according to Table 3.2 below.
We choose the initial labour income tax rate to be < (0 = 023 as in Cooley
and Hansen (1992, p.305) and assume a credible pre-announced permanent
12See Appendix C.1 for details on derivations.
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Parameter Value Parameter Value
 100  000
 033 
 8
 099  008
 100 ¯ 100
Table 3.2: Calibration for the case with labour income tax only.
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Figure 3.4: Consumption (a) and capital dynamics under learning (solid
curve) and perfect foresight (dashed curve). The dotted horizontal line
indicates the (new) steady state, the dotted vertical line indicates period
A.
increase by 10% to < (1 = 02530. These parameter choices yield initial steady-
state employment of :0 = 03774, which corresponds to 906 hours per day.
Simulations for the rst 450 periods are displayed in Figures 3.4(a) to 3.4(b)
below.
We nd that the only qualitative dierence in the dynamics compared to
the case of lump-sum taxation with elastic labour supply, is the remarkably
slower convergence. We conjecture that this is due to the dierent calibration
of key parameters such as ,  and (.
3.4.2 Capital Income Tax
Let us now assume that < &% = <
(
% = < % = 0 for all = and <
)
%  [0 1]. The Euler
equation (3.8) now changes to
#1% = (#

%+1(=))
1[(1 ) + (1 <)%+1(=))2%+1(=)]
and forward substitution of this equation yields
#%+*(=) = 
*(@)%%+*(=))#% (3.35)
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where we dene @)%%+*(=)  *=1[(1)+(1<)%+(=))2%+(=)]. Furthermore,
notice that the consumption leisure trade-o is again given by (3.19). Given
the adequate transversality condition for capital
lim
+ 7
³
@)%%++ (=)
´1

%+++1(=) = 0 (3.36)
the inter-temporal budget constraint of the consumer is given by
#% +
X
*=1
1
@)%%+*(=)
#%+*(=) = [(1 ) + (1 <)% (=))2%]
% +%:%
+
X
*=1
1
@)%%+*(=)
[%+*(=),¯ #%+*(=)]
By the virtue of (3.35) as well as (3.19) we can rewrite the latter as
(1 + )
(1 )#% = [(1)+(1<
)
% (=))2%]
%+%,¯+
X
*=1
1
@)%%+*(=)
%+*(=),¯ (3.37)
For rms again nothing changes compared to the base case in Section 3.3.
Finally, the government now faces the constraint
8% = <
)
% 2%
% (3.38)
in each period =. The economy-wide resource constraint is again given by
(3.1).
We now consider the scenario of a permanent change in the capital in-
come tax rate. The rate is changed from <)0 to <
)
1 at some point in time A.
The dynamics under perfect foresight are again standard. Under learning
we follow the approach of Evans et al. (2009, p.943). The innite sum on
the right-hand side of (3.37) is
'2 =
X
*=1
1
@)%%+*(=)
%+*(=),¯ (3.39)
Given (3.16) and (3.17), for 1  =  A we calculate13
'2 =
(=),¯
[(1 <)0)2(=) ]
+ (=),¯×

[(1 ) + (1 <)1)2(=)]%+

1 [(1 ) + (1 <)1)2(=)]1
 [(1 ) + (1 <
)
0)2
(=)]%+

1 [(1 ) + (1 <)0)2(=)]1
¸
(3.40)
13See Appendix C.1 for details on derivations.
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and for =  A we calculate
'2 =
(=),¯
[(1 <)1)2(=) ]
 (3.41)
From (3.37) follows that we have
#% =
(1 )
(1 + )
{[(1 ) + (1 <)0)2%]
% +%,¯+
(=),¯
[(1 <)0)2(=) ]
+ (=),¯×

[(1 ) + (1 <)1)2(=)]%+

1 [(1 ) + (1 <)1)2(=)]1
 [(1 ) + (1 <
)
0)2
(=)]%+

1 [(1 ) + (1 <)0)2(=)]1
¸
}
(3.42)
for 1  =  A and
#% =
(1 )
(1 + )

[(1 ) + (1 <)1)2%]
% + %,¯+
(=),¯
[(1 <)1)2(=) ]
¸
(3.43)
for =  A. Given a calibration, we can compute the dynamics of consump-
tion and other endogenous variables.
Now let’s return to the numerical example. Here we calibrate the model
according to Table 3.3 below.
Parameter Value Parameter Value
 100  000
 033 
 8
 099  008
 085 ¯ 100
Table 3.3: Calibration for the case with capital income tax only.
We choose the initial capital income tax rate to be <)0 = 05000 as in
Cooley and Hansen (1992, p.305) and assume a credible pre-announced per-
manent increase by 10% to <)1 = 05500. These parameter choices yield
initial steady-state employment of :0 = 04848, which corresponds to 116
hours per day.
Simulation results are displayed in Figures 3.5(a) to 3.5(b) below.
The only qualitative dierence we can nd in the dynamics, is the larger
size of uctuations and higher frequency of them. We can also observe that
under learning time paths need more periods to converge to the steady-state
compared to the case of lump-sum tax or labour income tax.
3.4.3 Consumption Tax
Let us now assume that < (% = <
)
% = < % = 0 for all = and <
&
%  [0 1]. The Euler
equation (3.8) now changes to
#1% = (#

%+1(=))
1 (1 + < &%)
(1 + < &%+1(=))
[(1 ) + 2%+1(=)]
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Figure 3.5: Consumption (a) and capital (b) dynamics under learning (solid
curve) and perfect foresight (dashed curve). The dotted horizontal line
indicates the (new) steady state, the dotted vertical line indicates period
A.
and forward substitution of this expression yields
#%+*(=) = 
*@&%%+*(=)#% (3.44)
where we dene @&%%+*(=) 

(1+0)
(1+0	+(%))
¸
@%%+*(=). Next we notice that the
consumption leisure trade-o in this case is
:% = ,¯ (1 + <
&
%)#%
%
 (3.45)
Given the adequate transversality condition for capital (3.18), the inter-
temporal budget constraint of the consumer is given by
(1 + < &%)#% +
X
*=1
1
@%%+*(=)
(1 + < &%+*(=))#

%+*(=) = [(1 ) + 2%]
% + %:%
+
X
*=1
1
@%%+*(=)
%+*(=):

%+*(=)
which by the virtue of (3.44) as well as (3.45) yields
(1 + )
(1 )(1 + <
&
%)#% = [(1 ) + 2%]
% + %,¯+ '1 (3.46)
For rms nothing changes compared to the base case in Section 3.3. Finally
government now faces the constraint
8% = <
&
%#% (3.47)
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in each period =. The economy-wide resource constraint again is given by
(3.1).
We now consider the scenario of a permanent change in the consumption
tax rate from < &0 to <
&
1 at some point in time A. The dynamics under
perfect foresight are again standard. Under learning we follow again the
methodology of Evans et al. (2009, p.943). The innite sum on the right-
hand side of (3.46) is equal to '1 =
	(%).¯
/	(%) as in Section 3.3. Obviously
from (3.46) follows that we have
#% =
(1 )
(1 + )(1 + < &0)

[(1 ) + 2%]
% +%,¯+ 
(=),¯
2(=) 
¸
(3.48)
for 1  =  A and
#% =
(1 )
(1 + )(1 + < &1)

[(1 ) + 2%]
% +%,¯+ 
(=),¯
2(=) 
¸
(3.49)
for =  A. Given a calibration, we have everything at hands to compute
the dynamics of consumption and the other endogenous variables.
Note that inspection of (3.48) and (3.49) makes clear that in the case
of a consumption tax the dynamics of consumption are independent of the
implementation date A. At least, this is true in our economy.14 This fact
may have a major impact on the dynamics.
In order to illustrate the dynamics numerically we calibrate the model
according to Table 3.4 below.
Parameter Value Parameter Value
 100  000
 033 
 8
 099  008
 125 ¯ 100
Table 3.4: Calibration for the case with consumption tax only.
Initial consumption tax rate is < &0 = 00500 as in Giannitsarou (2007,
p.1424) and assume a credible pre-announced permanent increase by 10% to
< &1 = 00550. These parameter choices yield initial steady-state employment
of :0 = 03299, which approximately corresponds to 80 hours per day.
Simulation results are displayed in Figures 3.6(a) to 3.6(b) below.
We observe that the dynamics of the consumption tax reform coincide
for perfect foresight and learning. It appears, that in both cases, the con-
sumption tax only matters in the period when it is changed, as suspected in
our motivation above. We presume that this result depends on our utility
specication with regard to consumption, that is log-utility. Ljungqvist and
14Compare (3.42) for the case of the capital income tax or for the labour income tax.
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Figure 3.6: Consumption (a) and capital (b) dynamics under learning (solid
curve) and perfect foresight (dashed curve). The dotted horizontal line
indicates the (new) steady state, the dotted vertical line indicates period
A.
Sargent (2000, p.318) present results for a power utility function under per-
fect foresight. The dierent perfect foresight dynamics therein suggest that
the specication of utility may be the source of our result.
Nevertheless it would be an interesting subject of study to check, whether
one can formally prove that the dynamics in response to a change in the
consumption tax under learning and perfect foresight are similar in general,
but we leave that to future research.
3.4.4 Policy Experiments
Let us now assume that < &%  <
(
% <
)
%  [0 1] and < % 6= 0 for all =. The Euler
equation (3.8) now changes to
#1% = (#

%+1(=))
1

(1 + < &%)
(1 + < &%+1(=))
¸
[(1 ) + (1 <)%+1(=))2%+1(=)]
and forward substitution of this expression yields
#%+*(=) = 
*@)%%+*(=)
"
(1 + < &%)
(1 + < &%+*(=))
#
#% (3.50)
Furthermore, notice that the consumption leisure trade-o is now given by
(3.10). Given the adequate transversality condition for capital (3.36), the
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inter-temporal budget constraint of the consumer is
(1 + < &%)#% +
X
*=1
1
@)%%+*(=)
(1 + < &%+*(=))#

%+*(=)
= [(1 ) + (1 <)% )2%]
% + (1 < (%)%:%  < %
+
X
*=1
1
@)%%+*(=)
[(1 < (%+*(=))%+*(=):%+*(=) < %+*(=)]
which by the virtue of (3.50) as well as (3.10) yields
(1 + )
(1 )(1 + <
&
%)#% = [(1 ) + (1 <)% )2%]
% + (1 < (%)%,¯ < %
+
X
*=1
1
@)%%+*(=)
[(1 < (%+*(=))%+*(=),¯ < %+*(=)]
= [(1 ) + (1 <)% )2%]
% + (1 < (%)%,¯ < %
+
X
*=1
1
@)%%+*(=)
[%+*(=),¯ < (%+*(=)%+*(=),¯ < %+*(=)]
= [(1 ) + (1 <)% )2%]
% + (1 < (%)%,¯ < %
+'2  'A3  'A4 (3.51)
For rms nothing changes compared to the base case in Section 3.3. Finally
government now faces the constraint (3.15) in each period =. The economy-
wide resource constraint is again given by (3.1).
We now consider the scenario of a permanent (simultaneous) change in
(some of the) taxes at some point in time A. The dynamics under perfect
foresight are again standard. Under learning we again follow the approach
Evans et al. (2009, p.943). The innite sum '2 on the right-hand side of
(3.51) is already known to be
'2 =
(=),¯
[(1 <)0)2(=) ]
+ (=),¯×

[(1 ) + (1 <)1)2(=)]%+

1 [(1 ) + (1 <)1)2(=)]1
 [(1 ) + (1 <
)
0)2
(=)]%+

1 [(1 ) + (1 <)0)2(=)]1
¸
(3.52)
for 1  =  A and
'2 =
(=),¯
[(1 <)1)2(=) ]
(3.53)
for =  A from Section 3.4.2. 'A3 on the right-hand side of (3.51) is
'A3 =
X
*=1
1
@)%%+*(=)
< (%+*(=)

%+*(=),¯ (3.54)
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Given (3.16) and (3.17), for 1  =  A we calculate15
'A3 =
< (0 
(=),¯
[(1 <)0)2(=) ]
+ (=),¯×

< (1 [(1 ) + (1 <)1)2(=)]%+

1 [(1 ) + (1 <)1)2(=)]1
 <
(
0 [(1 ) + (1 <)0)2(=)]%+

1 [(1 ) + (1 <)0)2(=)]1
¸
(3.55)
and for =  A we calculate
'A3 =
< (1 
(=),¯
[(1 <)1)2(=) ]
 (3.56)
Finally, 'A4 on the right-hand side of (3.51) is
'A4 =
X
*=1
1
@)%%+*(=)
< %+*(=) (3.57)
Given (3.16) and (3.17), for 1  =  A we calculate
'A4 =
<0
[(1 <)0)2(=) ]
+ [
[(1 ) + (1 <)1)2(=)]%+

1 [(1 ) + (1 <)1)2(=)]1
<1
 [(1 ) + (1 <
)
0)2
(=)]%+

1 [(1 ) + (1 <)0)2(=)]1
<0 ] (3.58)
and for =  A we calculate
'A4 =
<1
[(1 <)1)2(=) ]
 (3.59)
Given (3.51) we can then compute the dynamics responses for consumption
and the other endogenous variables as before. Now, we will conduct several
policy experiments numerically and compute welfare measures following the
approach of Cooley and Hansen (1992, p.301).16 Intuitively speaking, we
compute the increase in consumption that an individual would require to be
as well o as under the equilibrium allocation without taxes. We express
that number in percentage of output. First, we will do so for our initial
choice of tax levels (see line 1 in Table 3.6 below). Thereafter, we carry
out policy reforms, where we change taxes in a certain way and each time
recalculate welfare measure both for learning and perfect foresight. As a
result we can then compare the welfare implications for a tax change under
perfect foresight against the case under learning. Note that we use the
15See appendices C.1 and C.1 for the details on derivations of 3 and 4.
16We detail the computation in Appendix C.2.
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measure of Cooley and Hansen (1992, p.301) for the transition paths. We
do so because their measure for static comparison would lead to the same
number for perfect foresight and learning, as in both cases the initial and
new steady-states are identical.
An additional parameter needs to be chosen. That is the evaluation
horizon A . Cooley and Hansen (1992, p.301) choose a horizon A  2000 and
give no further detail on the motivation of that choice. Garcia-Milà et al.
(2010) use A = 200 and give no motivation either. We will choose the latter
in our welfare evaluations. For the series of experiments in Table 3.6 below,
our calibration of the model is according to Table 3.5 below.
Parameter Value Parameter Value
 100  000
 033 
 8
 099  008
 099 ¯ 100
Table 3.5: Model calibration for policy experiments 1 4
We choose the initial tax rates to be <0 = 00000, < (0 = 02300, <
)
0 =
05000 and < &0 = 00500. These non-zero tax rates lead to distortions. The
rst row in Table 3.6 reveals the welfare loss between the steady-state of
the economy without taxes and the steady-state of the economy with our
initially chosen tax rates amounts to 7372%. This number tells us the
change in consumption (in percentage of output) which is required so that
households in the economy with initial tax levels are as well o as in the
case with zero taxes is 7372%. Be aware that Table 3.6 also indicates that
without taxes our calibration yields a rst best steady-state employment of
:1 = 04024, which implies 9.66 hours. With the initial taxes in place, the
steady-state employment is :0 = 04326, which implies 10.38 hours.
Now we assume a credible pre-announced permanent tax reform that
favours capital accumulation, i.e. we lower the capital income tax to a level
of <)1 = 02500. As suggested by Judd (1987), Lucas (1990) and Cooley and
Hansen (1992), this is expected to reduce the welfare costs of distortionary
taxation. In each experiment reported lines 2 to 4 in Table 3.6 below, one
of the other tax instruments, <•, < (• or < &• will be raised to a level that
ensures that the periodic tax revenue in the new steady-state is the same
as in the initial steady-state.17 The second row of Table 3.6 indicates that
compensating the cut in the capital income tax to <)1 by an increase in
17Note, that as long as the dynamics under learning and perfect foresight dier, one is
not able to equalize present values of tax revenues under learning and perfect foresight to
the present value of tax revenues in the initial steady-state by manipulating tax rates in
the same way. This approach was used in the analysis of Cooley and Hansen (1992) for
perfect foresight only, but is not feasible in our case. In addition, we believe that keeping
present values constant is not the kind of scal policy change that governments conduct
in reality. Moreover, we believe that our comparison of welfare costs under learning to
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the labour income tax to < (1 leads to a welfare improvement under perfect
foresight as well as under learning as both welfare measures decrease. But
the numbers also reveal that the magnitude of the improvement diers.
Whereas under learning the welfare measure goes down from 7372% to
7212%, under perfect foresight it decreases much more to 6447%.18 We
can also observe that the new steady-state employment :1 is lower than the
initial steady-state employment :0.
The pattern just described is also true, if we compensate the cut in <)•
by an increase in < &• or <• as the third and fourth row in Table 3.6 indicate.
It is noteworthy that using the the lump-sum tax to compensate for the cut
in the capital income tax yields the largest welfare improvement and keeps
steady-state employment at the highest level independent of the assumption
about expectations.
Thus, experiments 2 to 4 indicate that the resulting welfare improve-
ments of an anticipated tax reform might be much smaller in magnitude
under learning compared to its improvements under perfect foresight.
welfare costs under perfect foresight is valid even without equalizing present values of the
tax revenue.
18We would like to emphasize that we set the rate of depreciation to  = 0 in order to
achieve convergence for the dynamics under learning. That might be the reason, why the
scale of W both under learning and perfect foresight is approximately twice the scale as
the results in Cooley and Hansen (1992).
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3.5 Conclusion
We demonstrate that under the assumption of elastic labour supply the re-
sponses to anticipated permanent lump-sum tax changes when agents learn
are remarkably dierent compared to their counterparts under perfect fore-
sight. The dynamics under learning appear to oscillate around the steady-
state to which they converge slowly. Thus, there is more volatility under
learning.
However sensitivity analyses show that even under inelastic labour sup-
ply these oscillations may be present for some choices of the gain parameter.
We also nd that a smaller gain parameter leads to higher volatility in our
framework. This result is at odds with conventional wisdom about the link
between the gain parameter and the dynamic responses in the learning liter-
ature. Overall, we detect two sources that may lead to oscillatory dynamics
under learning given an anticipated permanent lump-sum tax change. These
are the assumption of elastic labour supply and the choice of the gain para-
meter in the learning rule.
In the subsequent analysis we derive the dynamics for several distor-
tionary taxes and illustrate that the dynamics for labour income as well as
capital income tax rate changes are quite similar to changes of the lump-sum
tax given elastic labour supply. Again we observe oscillating time paths. In
case of a consumption tax, there is no oscillatory behaviour for the dynamics
under learning, at least when agents have a log-utility function.
Moreover, policy experiments in the presence of multiple tax instruments
indicate that the magnitude of welfare improvements due to the tax reform
considered herein appears to be substantially lower under the assumption of
learning compared to the case of perfect foresight. The reason may be the
oscillatory behaviour of the dynamics under learning.
Form our point of view these results raise two major issues. First, os-
cillatory dynamic responses to exogenous shocks are rarely found in actual
economic data. This fact questions the suitability of the model herein for
policy analysis. Second, given that this model would be suitable for policy
analysis, our results indicate that permanent tax changes may lead to lower
welfare improvements under learning compared to perfect foresight.
We believe that future research in this area needs to come up with con-
vincing empirical evidence on whether or how agents learn about scal pol-
icy. In addition, we also need to clarify from actual economic data, how
the dynamic responses to anticipated permanent tax changes look like. Are
they smooth or oscillatory?
With regard to theoretical considerations, it would also be desirable to
derive a version of the model that allows for changing dierent tax rates at
dierent points in time and therefore allows for public debt accumulation.
But this task is beyond the focus of this study and we aim to pursue that
idea in subsequent research.
3.5. CONCLUSION 87
Furthermore, we think that perfect foresight and the implied once and
for all choices of agents on the one hand and learning which implies peri-
odic revision of current and future choices of agents on the other hand are
extreme cases. One could also imagine agents that use adaptive learning,
but infrequently and with diering interval length update their expectations
and revise their current and future choices. Alternatively, agents randomly
receive a signal to update their expectations.
In addition, more sophisticated computational methods may allow to
calibrate the rate of depreciation dierent from zero or more realistic values
of the elasticity of labour supply and still ensure convergence for the dynam-
ics under learning on the other side. This could facilitate numerical results
that are directly comparable to the existing literature in public nance.
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Appendix A
Proofs for Chapter 1
Proof of Proposition 1
Proof. Denote the objective function as
()   + max

[() 	] + 
Case I,  
 1 .
(1.25) implies
if   


= 0 (A.1)
if  
 


=
1
	
 (A.2)
Then (A.1) implies,
if    0() =  1 
 0 (A.3)
which means that the objective function is decreasing in  for all   .
Furthermore, the second condition in (1.25) implies,
if  
  () =  + [() ] +  (A.4)
Computation then shows that
if  
  0() =  1 + [0()1
	
 ] (A.5)
Furthermore,
lim

0() =  1 + [0(

	
)
1
	
 ] =  1 
 0 (A.6)
Therefore, (A.3) and (A.6) imply that the optimal () is reached when
 
  and  satises
 1 + [0()1
	
 ] = 0 (A.7)
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Substituting 	 from (1.24) into (A.7) gets
 1 + [
0()
0()
 ] = 0 (A.8)
Substituting  from  = 11+ and the Fisher equation (1.26) into (A.3) and
rearranging yields (1.27). Given the knowledge of , (1.24) and the FOC
of (1.25) for    implies (1.28). Similarly, substituting (1.24) into the
denition of  yields (1.29).
Case II,  = 1 .
As mentioned above, we only consider the equilibrium of the economy
in the case 1+ =  but as a limit as 1+   from above. By continuity
of all functions, this case can be proved using the same arguments as above.
Proof of Proposition 2
Proof. Computation shows that
	[
0()
0() ]
	
=
00()0() 0()00()
[0()]2

 0
lim
0
0()
0()
= +
lim
+
0()
0()
= 0
Then, given   0, the solution of  for (1.27) exist and is unique. Further-
more,  is decreasing in , i.e., 		
 
 0. To see that  is also decreasing in ,
we have, by the virtue of (1.29) in Proposition 1,


=




= 00()



 0
Proof of Proposition 3
Proof. Firstly, (1.36) implies (1.40) directly. Then (1.40) and (1.37) give us
(1.41). The total matching amount  is  by denition, which is (1.42).
Subtracting (1.14) from (1.13) and using the steady state condition yields
[1 (1 )]() = ()  (¯) + 
Z ¯

max{() 0}	 ()
(A.9)
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(1.22) can be rewritten as
[1(1)] () = +()()+
Z ¯

max{ () 0}	 () (A.10)
Adding (A.9) and (A.10) and using the denition of  implies
[1 (1 )]() = +() (¯)+
Z ¯

()	 () (A.11)
Using the fact that () = (), (A.11) becomes
[1(1 )]() = +()  (¯)+
Z ¯

()	 () (A.12)
Taking the derivative of (A.12) with respect to  yields
0() =
1
1 (1 ) (A.13)
(A.12) and (A.13) imply after integration by parts that
[1 (1 )]() =  + ()  (¯) + 
Z ¯

0()[1  ()]	
=  + ()  (¯)
+

1 (1 )
Z ¯

[1  ()]	 (A.14)
Setting  =  and  = ¯ in (A.14) implies
(¯) =  + () + 
1 (1 )
Z ¯

[1  ()]	 (A.15)
[1(1)](¯)+(¯) = ¯+()+ 
1 (1 )
Z ¯

[1 ()]	
(A.16)
Using (1.18) and (1.35) to eliminate (¯) from (A.15) yields

1  ·  =  + () +

1 (1 )
Z ¯

[1  ()]	 (A.17)
Substituting  from (1.23) into (A.17) and using the expression of  in
(1.40), we get (1.39). Subtracting (A.15) from (A.16) yields
[1 (1 )](¯) = ¯   (A.18)
Substituting (¯) from (1.18) into (A.18) implies (1.38)
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Proof of Lemma 4
Proof. It is obvious that the left hand side of (1.38) is an increasing function
of  and independent of ; while the right hand side of (1.38) is a decreasing
function of  and independent of . Therefore, (1.38) slopes downward in
( ) space.
Denote the left hand side of (1.39) by ( ). Computation shows
that


= 1 
1  +  +
()
 ( 1)
 0() +

1 (1 ) ()  0


=  
1  
 ()
[ ( 1)]2
()
	 ( 1)
	

 0
This implies,

	
	
	
	
 0
Therefore, (1.39) slopes upward in ( ) space. Furthermore, computation
shows that


= 

1 +
 ()
 ( 1)
¸
 0
such that

	
	
	
	
 0
This implies that, for any given ,  become smaller when () goes down,
i.e. (1.39) shifts down if () goes down.
Appendix B
Proofs for Chapter 2
Proof of Proposition 6
Proof. If the constrain 	   does not bind, the rst order condition for
problem (TT) reads,
0() = 1 (B.1)
	 = (1 !)() + ! (B.2)
With the denition of , (B.1) and (B.2) become
 =  (B.3)
	 =   (1 !)(
) + !

 (B.4)
If the constrain 	   does bind, problem (TT) becomes
max

[() ][  ]1
The rst order condition for above problem reads,
 =
!0() + (1 !)()
!0() + 1 ! = "() (B.5)
(B.3) to (B.5) imply that
if   


=
	

= 0 (B.6)
if  
 


=

"0()

	

= 1 (B.7)
Problem (RB) of last period reads,
max

{[() 	] + ( 1)}
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Denote the objective function as ()  [(()) 	] + ( 1)
Case I,  
 1 .
(B.6) implies
if    0() =  1 
 0 (B.8)
which means that the object function is decreasing in  for all   . (B.7)
implies
if  
  0() = 
0()
"0()
 +  1 (B.9)
Furthermore,
0()
"0()
=
0()[!0() + 1 !]2
0()[!0() + 1 !] !(1 !)[() ]00() (B.10)
lim

0()
"0()
=
1
1 !(1 !)[() ]00()  1 (B.11)
The inequality is strict except for ! = 1; (B.11) uses the facts that 00 
 0
and ()   (this is true because rstly 00 
 0 and 0() = 1 imply
0()  1 whenever  
 ; secondly (0) = 0 and above results imply
()  R 0 0()	  R 0 1	  ). Therefore,
lim

0() = ( lim

0()
"0()
 1) +  1 
 0 (B.12)
(B.8) and (B.12) imply that the optimal  is reached when  
  and
satises
0() = 
0()
"0()
 +  1 = 0 (B.13)
The real balance choice satises (B.5), and 	 =  always holds. It is a
natural conclusion because it is costly to carry cash when the Friedman rule
does not hold.
Substituting  from  = 11+ and the Fisher equation (2.42) into (B.13)
and rearranging, we get (2.43). Similarly, substituting  into (B.5) and
using the stationary condition ( = ˆ for there is no economic growth in the
present model), we get (2.45).
Case II,  = 1 .
As mentioned in the text, we only consider the equilibrium of the econ-
omy in the case 1+ =  when the equilibrium is the limit as 1+   from
above. The proof of this case follows therefore from the same arguments as
in the previous case and continuity.
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Proof of Proposition 7
Proof. Given that 
0()
0() is strictly deceasing for all    and lim0
0()
0() =
+, it is obvious that the solution of  in (2.43) exist and is unique. Fur-
thermore,  is decreasing in , i.e., in equilibrium,



 0 (B.14)
(2.43) implies that in equilibrium
0()
"0()
 1 (B.15)
(B.10) implies that,
0()
"0()
 1 (B.16)
Therefore, given that 
0()
0() is strictly deceasing, (B.15) and (B.16) imply that
in equilibrium,
   (B.17)
must hold and that the equality holds if and only if  = 0 and ! = 1.
To see that  is also decreasing in , we have, by the virtue of Proposition
6,
 = 	  = "()  = (1 !)[() ]
!0() + 1 !  (B.18)
The computation then shows that


=




= (1 !) [
0() 1][!0() + 1 !] ![() ]00()
[!0() + 1 !]2



(B.19)
(B.17) implies that in equilibrium,
0()  1 (B.20)
and
()   (B.21)
for the same reason as we established in last proof. Combining (B.14),
(B.19), (B.20), (B.21), and the fact 00 
 0, gives us that in equilibrium,


 0
must always hold and the equality holds only when  = 0 and ! = 1.
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Proof of Proposition 10
Proof. We rst look at the support of #(). (2.40) implies that the slope
of $0() is
	[$0()]
	
=  ¯()
1 (1 )  0
which implies that the lowest wage which workers get to exit unemployment
is $0(p¯). Similarly, (2.17) implies that the slope of $1() is
	[$1()]
	
= 1  0
which implies that the highest possible wage is $1(p¯). The support of #()
is the interval [$0(p¯) $1(p¯)].
To determine #(), we now count the measure of workers earning less
than  in any rm, and then integrate over the relevant set of rms. There-
fore, we are going to use the expression of %( | ) and %() when deriving
#(). Note that the functional forms of %( | ) and %() we got in section
2.3.4 are restricted in their meaningful segments. So we have to partition
the support of () to get an accurate expression of #().
Case I : $0(p¯)   
 $0(p
¯
). Here the wage is so low that the least
productive rms are even hardly attractive to unemployed worker. Following
the denition, rms with productivity greater than $10 () can hire workers
for less than . And with  in the range $0(p¯)   
 $0(p
¯
), $10 () p
¯
,
so not all rms will actually be able to have employees paid less than .
Accordingly, #() is given by,
(1 )#() = &
Z p¯
10 ()
%( | ')	(') (B.22)
Then we substitute %( | ') from (2.54) into (B.22) and use the expression
of %(·) in (2.49) to get
#() =

1 
Z p¯
10 ()
 + 
{ + ¯[(( ')]}2
	(') (B.23)
Then, substituting  from the labour market steady state condition (2.46)
into (B.23) yields the equality in the second line of (2.55). Note that the
continuity of #() at  = $0(p¯), is ensured by $
1
0 [$0(p¯)] =p¯.
Case II : $0(p
¯
)   
 $1(p
¯
). In this case, all rms are productive enough
to attract at least some workers by an oer of . #() is thus simply given
by
(1 )#() = &
Z p¯
p
¯
%( | ')	(') (B.24)
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Then we substitute %( | ') from (2.54) into (B.24) and use the expression
of %(·) in (2.49) to get
#() =

1 
Z p¯
p
¯
 + 
{ + ¯[(( ')]}2
	(') (B.25)
Similarly, substituting  from the labour market steady state condition
(2.46) into (B.25) gets the equality in the third line of (2.55). Note that
the continuity of #() at  = $0(p
¯
), is ensured by $10 [$0(p
¯
)] =p
¯
.
Case III : $1(p
¯
)   
 $1(p¯). In this case, all rms have employees paid
less than , but only those more productive than $1() also have employees
paid more than . We thus have to distinguish between those two categories
of rms to dene #():
(1 )#() = &
Z 11 ()
p
¯
%(')	(') +&
Z p¯
11 ()
%( | ')	(') (B.26)
Then we substitute %( | ') from (2.54) into (B.24) and use the expression
of %(·) in (2.49) to get
#() =

1  [
Z 11 ()
p
¯
 + 
[ + ¯(')]2
	(')+
Z p¯
11 ()
 + 
{ + ¯[(( ')]}2	(')]
(B.27)
Similarly, substituting  from the labour market steady state condition
(2.46) into (B.27) gets the equality in the fourth line of (2.55). Note that
the continuity of #() at  = $1(p
¯
), is ensured by $11 [$1(p
¯
)] =p
¯
and thusZ 11 [1(p¯)]
p
¯
 + 
[ + ¯(')]2
	(') = 0
while the continuity of #() at  = $1(p¯), is ensured by $
1
1 [$1(p¯)] =p¯ and
thus Z p¯
11 [1(¯)]
 + 
{ + ¯[(( ')]}2
	(') = 0

Z 11 [1(¯)]
p
¯
 + 
[ + ¯(')]2
	(') = 
Z p¯
p
¯
 + 
[ + ¯(')]2
	(')
= 
&

Z p¯
p
¯
%(')	(')
= 
&

· 1
&
(p¯)
 + ¯(p¯)
= 1 (B.28)
where the second equality of (B.28) employs the expression of %(·) in (2.49);
the third equality employs the evaluation of (2.48) at  =p¯; the last equality
employs (p¯) = 1, ¯(p¯) = 0.
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Proof of Proposition 11
Proof. It is obvious that (2.40) implies
w
¯

=
$0(p¯)

=
$0(p¯)



=
¯[  (	 )]
1 (1 ) · ( )


 0
(B.29)
where the last inequality uses ¯(·)  0 and the conclusion in Proposition 7
that 		
 
 0.
Similarly, (2.17) implies that
w¯

=
$1(p¯)

=
$1(p¯)



= 



 0 (B.30)
Proof of Lemma 12
Proof. Given , dene (·) as [(( )] = . Then,
	())
	)
|=() =
	[(( )]
	(( )
=
	[(( )]
	

(( )
= 1 · [(( )

]1(B.31)
Dierentiating both side of (2.32) with respect to  gives us
(( )

= 1 +

1 (1 )(1)¯[(( )]
(( )


which could be rearranged to get
(( )

= [1 +
¯[(( )]
1 (1 ) ]
1 (B.32)
(B.31) and (B.32) then implies
	())
	)
|=() =
	[(( )]
	(( )
= 1 +
¯[(( )]
1 (1 )  (B.33)
Henceforth, (2.18), the denition of (), and (2.16) imply,
() =
Z 1()
0()
()	%( | ) =
Z 1()
0()
( +  )	%( | ) (B.34)
Integrating (B.34) by parts gives us,
() = ( +  )%( | )|1()0() 
Z 1()
0()
%( | )	( +  )
=
Z 1()
0()
%( | )	 (B.35)
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where we use the results
%( | )|=0() = 0
( +  )|=1() = 0
	( +  )
	
= 1
Equation (2.54) shows that (B.35) is equivalent to
() =
Z 1()
0()
[(( )]	 (B.36)
With the denition of (·), (B.36) could be rewritten as
() =
Z 1()
0()
[(( )]	[(( )] (B.37)
Now changing (( ) into ) in the integral in (B.37) yields the following
equivalent expression:
() =
Z 

())[1 +
¯())
1 (1 ) ]	)
where (B.33) and the following facts, which are rearrangement of (2.23)
(2.36), are used,
([$1() ] = 
([$0() ] =  
Proof of Proposition 13
Proof. (2.65) holds for all   [p
¯
p¯]. Therefore,
(p
¯
) *(p
¯
) = 0 (B.38)
Plugging (·) from (2.56) into (B.38) gives us,Z p
¯

())[1 +
¯())
1 (1 ) ]	) = *(p¯
) (B.39)
Then with the expression of (·) from (2.49), (B.39) becomesZ p
¯


&
 + 
[ + ¯())]2
[1 +
¯())
1 (1 ) ]	) = *(p¯
) (B.40)
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We know that ¯()) = 1, when ) p
¯
. Then simplifying the integrate in
(B.40) yields

&
1
 + 
[1 +

1 (1 ) ](p¯
 + ) = *(p
¯
) (B.41)
Plugging  from (2.64) into (2.46) gives us
& = (1 ) (B.42)
Solving (B.42) & yields (2.68). Then plugging & from (2.68) into (2.64)
gets (2.69). Now dividing (B.41) by (2.62) gives us
p
¯
 +  =
*(p
¯
)
* 0(p
¯
)
(B.43)
Substituting  from (2.41) into (B.43) and rearranging give us (2.66). Sub-
stituting & and  from (2.68) and (2.69) into (2.62) and rearranging give
us (2.67). Substituting & and  from (2.68) and (2.69) into (2.63) and
rearranging give us (2.70). Furthermore, given the property of *(·) that
* 0(0) = 0 and * 00  0, there is a unique positive solution of p¯ for (2.70).
Proof of Lemma 14
Proof. It is obvious that the left hand side of (2.66) is a decreasing function
of  and independent of p
¯
, for any xed value of . Taking the derivative
of right hand side of (2.66) with respect of p
¯
yields that
	[p
¯
 (p¯) 0(p
¯
) ]
	p
¯
= 1 *
0(p
¯
)* 0(p
¯
) *(p
¯
)* 00(p
¯
)
[* 0(p
¯
)]2
=
*(p
¯
)* 00(p
¯
)
[* 0(p
¯
)]2
 0 (B.44)
Consequently, (2.66) slopes downward in (p
¯
) space. Furthermore, the left
hand side of (2.66) is a decreasing function of  and independent of p
¯
. This
implies that (2.66) shifts up if () goes down.
It is obvious that the left hand side of (2.67) is an increasing function of
 and independent of p
¯
; while the right hand side of (2.67) is an increasing
function of p
¯
and independent of . Therefore, (2.67) slopes upward in (p
¯
)
space.
Proof of Lemma 15
Proof. We rst consider the case where the productivity investment deci-
sion yields  p¯. Suppose there is a rm with  p¯ in the economy, then
its labour force situation is as good as the rm with productivity p¯, in term
of employees measure and their wage distribution. The rm’s prot can be
expressed as
() = () *() = (p¯) + %(p¯)(  p¯) *()
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Computation then shows that
0() = %(p¯) * 0()
00() = * 00() 
 0
0(p¯) = 0
So when  p¯, it holds that
0() 
 0
which means that when  p¯
() 
 (p¯) = 0
We now consider a productivity investment decision yielding  
p
¯
. Sup-
pose there is a rm with  
p
¯
in the economy. We claim that for  
p
¯
,
() 
 () *()  () (B.45)
where we denote by () the prot of rms with productivity  in a econ-
omy with exogenous continuous productivity distribution over [p¯]. That is
because the rm is the least attractive rm in the economy for workers and
then its prot () (without considering the productivity investment cost)
is smaller than that of the rms of  in a economy with exogenous contin-
uous productivity distribution over [p¯]. It is obvious that (p
¯
) = (p
¯
).
Plugging the expression of () gives us,
() =
Z 


&
 + 
[ + ¯()]2
[1 +
¯())
1 (1 ) ]	) *()
=

&
1
( + )
[1 +

1 (1 ) ]
Z 

1	) *() (B.46)
Note that being less productive than  means being unable to attract
any worker and therefore cannot be optimal. We thus focus on values of
   . () is continuously dierentiable, and such that
0() =

&
1
( + )
[1 +

1 (1 ) ] *
0()
0(p
¯
) =

&
1
( + )
[1 +

1 (1 ) ] *
0(p
¯
) = 0
00() = * 00() 
 0
So when  
p
¯ 0()  0
which means that when  
p
¯
() 
 (p
¯
) = (p
¯
) = 0 (B.47)
Combining (B.45) and (B.47), we get for  
p
¯
that
() 
 0
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Proof of Proposition 18
Proof. Like in section 2.3.4, w
¯
= $0(p¯) and w¯= $1(p¯). Rewriting (2.40) and
(2.17) down and substituting  and  from (2.41) and (2.64) yield,
w
¯
= $0(p¯) = 
&
1 (1 )
Z p¯

1
¯(')	' (B.48)
w¯ = $1(p¯) = p¯+

1  (B.49)
where , p
¯
, & and ¯(·) are determined by (2.66), (2.67), (2.68), and (2.61).
We rst determine 	w¯	
 . The derivative of (B.49) with respect to  reads
w¯

=
(1 )

 (B.50)
We know that
	p
¯	
  0 from Proposition 16 and [p¯
 (p¯) 0(p
¯
) ]
0  0 from (B.44),
then (2.66) implies that
(1 )


 0 (B.51)
Combining this with (B.50) yields
w¯


 0 (B.52)
i.e., the upper bound of wages w
¯
drops when the ination rises.
We then determine 	w¯	
 . Note that ¯(·) is always continuously dieren-
tiable within the integration interval of (B.48). Dene $ = 1(1) and
rewrite (B.48) as
w
¯
=  $& [
Z p¯
p
¯
¯(')	'+
Z p
¯

1
¯(')	']
=  $& [
Z p¯
p
¯
¯(')	'+ 1 · (p
¯
 + 
1 )]
=  $[
Z p¯
p
¯
& ¯(')	'+&(p
¯
 + 
1 )] (B.53)
The derivative of (B.53) with respect to  reads
w
¯

= $[
Z p¯
p
¯
& ¯(')

	'& ¯(p
¯
)
p
¯

]
$[&

(p
¯
 + 
1 ) +&(
p
¯

+
(1 )

)]
= $[
Z p¯
p
¯
& ¯(')

	'+
&

(p
¯
 + 
1 ) +&
(1 )

](B.54)
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When   [p
¯
p¯], ¯() is determined in (2.61). Solving  out of (2.46) gets
 =

 + 
 (B.55)
Substituting  from (B.55) into (2.61) and then expressing  with & yields

[ + & ¯()]2
[1 +
& ¯()
1 (1 ) ] = *
0() (B.56)
Observation of (B.56) implies that & ¯() is solely determined by (B.56) for
any given   [p
¯
p¯], i.e.,
& ¯(')

= 0 (B.57)
Plugging (B.57) into (B.54) yields
w
¯

= $&

(p
¯
 + 
1 ) !&
(1 )

 (B.58)
The conclusion of 		
  0 from Proposition 16 and (2.68) imply that
&


 0 (B.59)
(B.43) implies that
p
¯
 + 
1   0 (B.60)
always hold. From (B.51) (B.58) - (B.60), it follows that
w
¯

 0
i.e., the lower bound of wage w
¯
rises when the ination rises.
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Appendix C
Proofs for Chapter 3
C.1 Model Derivations
Timing
We believe that the understanding of the timing is crucial to follow the
derivations. For time periods indexed by +, discounting periods indexed by
,, and an implementation date - announced in + = 1 and -  -  +
denoting the number of periods until - we got the following picture:
+ = 1 2 3 4 5 6 
, = 0 1 2 3 4 5 
-  -  + = 4 3 2 1 01 
thus for the innite sum over index ,
1X
=1
{•}+
X
=
{•} (C.1.1)
from period + = 1 perspective, given exemplary - = 5 on the line 1  + 
-  1, until , = 3 = -  1 we have the old tax rate. Furthermore, on the
line +  - from , = 4 = - onwards we have the new tax rate. Equivalently
for the innite sum
2X
=0
{•}+
X
=1
{•} (C.1.2)
from period + = 1 perspective, given exemplary - = 5 on the line 1  + 
-  1, until , = 2 = -  2 we have the old tax rate. Furthermore, on the
line +  - from , = 3 = -  1 onwards we have the new tax. This allows
us later on to replace - with -  + for 1  +  -  1 and -  1 with 0 for
+  -.
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Derivation of -1
Here we want to illustrate the methodology we apply in all derivations under
learning for the example of -1. Starting from
-1 =
X
=1
1
.  +(+)
/  +(+)
we split this innite sum into
-1 =

1X
=1
1
.  +(+)
/0 +
X
=
1
.  +(+)
/1

 
Next we go back to the denition of .  +(+). Given the learning rules
(3.16) and (3.17) we get
.  +(+) = 


=1 [(1 ) + 0(+)] = [(1 ) + 0(+)]  (C.1.3)
Consequently we get
-1 =

1X
=1
³
[(1 ) + 0(+)]1
´
/0 +
X
=
³
[(1 ) + 0(+)]1
´
/1

 
or
-1 = [(1 ) + 0(+)]1 ×

2X
=0
³
[(1 ) + 0(+)]1
´
/0 +
X
=1
³
[(1 ) + 0(+)]1
´
/1

 
Given the property of a nite geometric series
P!
=" *
 = 
+1	
1 for some
constant * , we get
-1 = [(1 ) + 0(+)]1 ×
"Ã
[(1 ) + 0(+)]1  1
[(1 ) + 0(+)]1  1
!
/0 +
Ã
 [(1 ) + 0(+)]1
[(1 ) + 0(+)]1  1
!
/1
#

which can be rewritten as
-1 =
/0
0(+)  +
(/1  /0)
[(1 ) + 0(+)]
[(1 ) + 0(+)]1
1 [(1 ) + 0(+)]1  (C.1.4)
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Now, considering the timing outlined in Appendix C.1 above, for 1  + 
-  1 we plug in -  + for - and get (3.24)
-1 =
/0
0(+)  + (/1  /0)
[(1 ) + 0(+)] 

1 [(1 ) + 0(+)]1  (C.1.5)
and for +  - we have -  1 = 0, thus we get (3.25)
-1 =
/1
0(+)   (C.1.6)
Derivation of -2
Starting from
-2 =
X
=1
1
.  +(+)
/ # +(+)

 +(+)%¯
and given the learning rules (3.16) and (3.17) as well as (C.1.3) from above
and / # + being either /
#
0 or /
#
1, we may split the innite sum above into
-2 = 
(+)%¯

1X
=1
³
[(1 ) + 0(+)]
´1
/ #0 +
X
=
³
[(1 ) + 0(+)]
´1
/ #1


or
-2 =
/ #0 
(+)%¯
[(1 ) + 0(+)]
2X
=0
³
[(1 ) + 0(+)]1
´
+
/ #1 
(+)%¯
[(1 ) + 0(+)]
X
=1
³
[(1 ) + 0(+)]1
´

Now, as above, the properties of the geometric series allow us to rewrite this
as
-2 =
/ #0 
(+)%¯
[(1 ) + 0(+)]
Ã
[(1 ) + 0(+)]1  1
[(1 ) + 0(+)]1  1
!
+
/ #1 
(+)%¯
[(1 ) + 0(+)]
Ã
 [(1 ) + 0(+)]1
[(1 ) + 0(+)]1  1
!

For the timing outlined in Appendix C.1 above, for 1  +  -  1 we plug
in -  + for - and get (3.31)
-2 = 
(+)%¯

/ #0
0(+)  +
³
/ #1  / #0
´ [(1 ) + 0(+)] 

1 [(1 ) + 0(+)]1
¸
(C.1.7)
and for +  - we have -  1 = 0, thus we get (3.32)
-2 =
/ #1 
(+)%¯
0(+)   (C.1.8)
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Derivation of 12
We start from (3.39)
12 =
X
=1
1
.$  +(+)
 +(+)%¯
Next, we recall the denition of .$  +(+). Given the learning rules (3.16)
and (3.17) we get
.$  +(+) = 


=1
h
(1 ) + (1 /$0)0(+)
i
=
h
(1 ) + (1 /$0)0(+)
i
(C.1.9)
for /$ +(+) = /
$
0 and
.$  +(+) = 


=1
h
(1 ) + (1 /$1)0(+)
i
=
h
(1 ) + (1 /$1)0(+)
i
(C.1.10)
for /$ +(+) = /
$
1. Thereafter, we split this innite sum into
12 = %¯

1X
=1
1
.$  +(+)
(+) +
X
=
1
.$  +(+)
(+)


= %¯[
1X
=1
(
h
(1 ) + (1 /$0)0(+)
i
)1(+) +
X
=
(
h
(1 ) + (1 /$1)0(+)
i
)1(+) ]
or
12 =
(+)%¯£
(1 ) + (1 /$0)0(+)
¤ 2X
=0
μh
(1 ) + (1 /$0)0(+)
i1¶
+
(+)%¯£
(1 ) + (1 /$1)0(+)
¤ X
=1
μh
(1 ) + (1 /$1)0(+)
i1¶

As in Section C.1 above, we exploit the properties of geometric series and
derive
12 =
(+)%¯£
(1 ) + (1 /$0)0(+)
¤ Ã1 £(1 ) + (1 /$0)0(+)¤1
1 £(1 ) + (1 /$0)0(+)¤1
!
+
(+)%¯£
(1 ) + (1 /$1)0(+)
¤ Ã £(1 ) + (1 /$1)0(+)¤1
1 £(1 ) + (1 /$1)0(+)¤1
!

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Now we get back to the timing outlined in Appendix C.1 above, for 1  + 
-  1 we plug in -  + for - and get (3.40)
12 =
(+)%¯
[(1 /$0)0(+) ]
+ (+)%¯×

[(1 ) + (1 /$1)0(+)] 

1 [(1 ) + (1 /$1)0(+)]1
 [(1 ) + (1 /
$
0)0
(+)] 

1 [(1 ) + (1 /$0)0(+)]1
¸
(C.1.11)
and for +  - we have -  1 = 0, thus we get (3.41)
12 =
(+)%¯
[(1 /$1)0(+) ]
 (C.1.12)
Derivation of -3
Starting from (3.54)
-3 =
X
=1
1
.$  +(+)
/ # +(+)

 +(+)%¯
for (C.1.9) and (C.1.10) and / # +(+) is either given by /
#
0 or /
#
1, we may once
more split the innite sum into
-3 = 
(+)%¯×
[
1X
=1
μh
(1 ) + (1 /$0)0(+)
i¶1
/ #0
+
X
=
μh
(1 ) + (1 /$1)0(+)
i¶1
/ #1 ]
or
-3 =
/ #0 
(+)%¯£
(1 ) + (1 /$0)0(+)
¤ 2X
=0
μh
(1 ) + (1 /$0)0(+)
i1¶
+
/ #1 
(+)%¯£
(1 ) + (1 /$1)0(+)
¤ X
=1
μh
(1 ) + (1 /$1)0(+)
i1¶

Now, the properties of the geometric series allow us to rewrite this as
-3 =
/ #0 
(+)%¯£
(1 ) + (1 /$0)0(+)
¤ Ã£(1 ) + (1 /$0)0(+)¤1  1£
(1 ) + (1 /$0)0(+)
¤1  1
!
+
/ #1 
(+)%¯£
(1 ) + (1 /$1)0(+)
¤ Ã £(1 ) + (1 /$1)0(+)¤1£
(1 ) + (1 /$1)0(+)
¤1  1
!

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For the timing outlined in Appendix C.1 above, for 1  +  -  1 we plug
in -  + for - and get (3.55)
-3 =
/ #0 
(+)%¯
[(1 /$0)0(+) ]
+ (+)%¯×

/ #1 [(1 ) + (1 /$1)0(+)] 

1 [(1 ) + (1 /$1)0(+)]1
 /
#
0 [(1 ) + (1 /$0)0(+)] 

1 [(1 ) + (1 /$0)0(+)]1
¸
(C.1.13)
and for +  - we have -  1 = 0, thus we get (3.56)
-3 =
/ #1 
(+)%¯
[(1 /$1)0(+) ]
 (C.1.14)
Derivation of -4
Starting from (3.57)
-4 =
X
=1
1
.$  +(+)
/  +(+)
given (C.1.9) and (C.1.10) are true and /  +(+) is either /0 or /1, we again
split the innite sum into
-4 = [
1X
=1
μh
(1 ) + (1 /$0)0(+)
i¶1
/0
+
X
=
μh
(1 ) + (1 /$1)0(+)
i¶1
/1 ]
or
-4 =
h
(1 ) + (1 /$0)0(+)
i1 2X
=0
μh
(1 ) + (1 /$0)0(+)
i1¶
/0


+
h
(1 ) + (1 /$1)0(+)
i1  X
=1
μh
(1 ) + (1 /$1)0(+)
i1¶
/1

 
Given the properties of geometric series we can rewrite the latter as
-4 =
h
(1 ) + (1 /$0)0(+)
i1Ã£(1 ) + (1 /$0)0(+)¤1  1£
(1 ) + (1 /$0)0(+)
¤1  1 /0
!
+
h
(1 ) + (1 /$1)0(+)
i1Ã £(1 ) + (1 /$1)0(+)¤1£
(1 ) + (1 /$1)0(+)
¤1  1/1
!

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Now given the timing outlined in Appendix C.1 above, for 1  +  -  1
we plug in -  + for - and get (3.58)
-4 =
/0
[(1 /$0)0(+) ]
+[
[(1 ) + (1 /$1)0(+)] 

1 [(1 ) + (1 /$1)0(+)]1
/1
 [(1 ) + (1 /
$
0)0
(+)] 

1 [(1 ) + (1 /$0)0(+)]1
/0 ] (C.1.15)
and for +  - we have -  1 = 0, thus we get (3.59)
-4 =
/1
[(1 /$1)0(+) ]
 (C.1.16)
C.2 Computing Welfare Changes
Comparative Statics
We follow the approach of Cooley and Hansen (1992, p.301) based on Lucas
(1990). Their measure of welfare change for a given policy change is derived
by solving
20 = log[1(1 + )
•)] +  log[1 31] (C.2.1)
for ) in our case.1 20 is the utility a household obtains in the steady-
state without any tax and 1 and 31 are the values of consumption and
employment at the new steady-state after the tax change either under perfect
foresight or learning. It follows that
)• =
exp(20)
1(1 31)%  1 (C.2.2)
Thus, in general, we need to solve for ) for the perfect foresight dynamics
and another ) for the dynamics under learning.2 Given )• we can calculate
W = 44
1
=
)•1
1
 (C.2.3)
where 44 is the restoration value of consumption, which in our case may
be interpreted as the total change in consumption required to restore a
household to the level of utility obtained under the allocation associated
with zero taxes. 1 is the level of output at the new steady-state.
1• is either  under perfect foresight or  under learning.
2Of course we are aware that this must yield the same  =  both under perfect-
foresight and under learning, but this number may be useful to compare dierent policy
experiments.
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Transition Measure
Again we follow the approach of Cooley and Hansen (1992, p.301) based
on Lucas (1990). Their measure of welfare change accounting for transition
given a policy change is derived by solving
X
 =1
 {log[ (1 + )•)] +  log[1 3 ] 20} = 0 (C.2.4)
for ) under perfect foresight and ) under learning. - is the terminal period,
 is period + consumption either under perfect foresight or learning and  
is period + output either under perfect foresight or learning.
)• =

 exp ¡20 £1 + +  ¤¢³

1
1  


´
×
h
(1 31)%
1
 (1 3 )%

i


1
[1++ ]
 1
)• =

 exp
³
20
P
 =1 
 
´
 =1

 × =1 (1 3 )%



1

=1 

 1 (C.2.5)
Given )• we can calculate
W• =
P
 =1 
 {) }P
 =1 
 { }
 (C.2.6)
which will be reported as W for the perfect foresight dynamics and as W
for the dynamics under learning.
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Abstract
We set up macroeconomics models with labour market frictions to evaluate
several public policies.
In the rst model, job creation and job destruction are investigated in
the presence of search frictions in both labour and goods markets as well
as rm heterogeneity. We show that both the unemployment rate and the
endogenous job destruction rate increase when the ination rate rises. Our
numerical exercises suggest that the destruction of lower productivity jobs
and the creation of higher productivity jobs may be ineciently low under
the Friedman rule, which in turn causes the deviation of optimal long run
monetary policy from the Friedman rule.
In the second model, we study the eect of ination on the wage disper-
sions due to rm heterogeneity and on-the-job search, in the context of a
labour market á la Postel-Vinay and Robin (International Economic Review
43, 2002) and micro-founded money demand. The productivity (distribu-
tion) of rms is rst assumed to be exogenously given. We nd that a
rise of ination diminishes the wage dispersion. We then allow the rms to
adjust their productivity level by investment. We then nd that a rise of
ination rst makes rms’ productivity less dispersed; and furthermore also
diminishes the wage dispersion.
In the third model, we study the impact of anticipated scal policy
changes in the Ramsey economy when agents form expectations of average
wage and interest rate using adaptive learning. We extend the existing
framework by distortionary taxes as well as elastic labour supply, which
makes agents’ decisions non-predetermined but more realistic. We detect
that the dynamic responses to anticipated tax changes under learning have
oscillatory behavior. Moreover, we demonstrate that this behavior can have
important implications for the welfare consequences of scal reforms.
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Zusammenfassung
In der Dissertation werden makroökonomische Modelle mit Arbeitsmarkts-
beschränkung verwendet, um einige Public Policies zu evaluieren.
In dem ersten Modell werden Job Creation und Job Destruction in Anwe-
senheit von sowohl Search Friction als auch Unternehmensheterogenität im
Arbeitsmarkt und Gütermarkt untersucht. Es wird gezeigt, dass nicht nur
die Arbeitslosenquote sondern auch die Rate der endogenen Job Creation
ansteigen, wenn die Inationsrate zunimmt. Die numerischen Ergebnisse
zeigen, dass die Zerstörung der Arbeitsplätze von geringerer Produktivität
und die Schaung der Arbeitsplätze von höherer Produktivität unter der
Friedman Rule wirkungslos niedrig sein können. Das führt darüber hinaus
die Deviation der optimalen Geldpolitik in der langen Frist herbei.
In dem zweiten Modell werden der Eekt der Ination auf Lohnspreizung
aufgrund der Unternehmensheterogenität und on-the-job Search im Rahmen
eines Arbeitsmarktes à la Postel-Vinay und Robin (International Economic
Review 43, 2002) und der mikrofundierten Geldnachfrage untersucht. Die
Produktivität (Distribution) der Firmen ist zunächst als exogen angenom-
men. Es wird gefunden, dass ein Anstieg der Ination die Lohnspreizung
vermindert. Lassen danach die Firmen ihres Produktivitätsniveau durch
Investition anpassen, macht ein Anstieg der Ination zuerst die Produktiv-
itätsniveau der Firmen weniger dispergiert (verteilt); weiterhin vermindert
es auch die Lohnspreizung.
In dem dritten Modell wird die Auswirkung der Veränderungen der an-
tizipierten Fiskalpolitik im Rahmen einer Ramsey Ökonomie analysiert, wo
Agenten Erwartungen über durchschnittlichen Lohn und Zinssatz durch
adaptives Lernen bilden. Der bestehende Rahmen wird mit verzerrenden
Steuern und elastisches Arbeitsangebot erweitert, was die Entscheidungen
der Agenten nicht vorher determiniert, sondern realistisch macht. Es wird
festgestellt, dass die dynamischen Reaktionen auf antizipierte Veränderun-
gen der Steuern unter Lernen einen oszillatorischen Charakter haben. Des
Weiteren wird es demonstriert, dass dieser Charakter Wohlfahrtsauswirkung
für Fiskalreform haben kann.
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